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Abstract
Lithuania  is a transition  economy undergoing rapid  Rutkowski  looks at all three  dimensions of labor
enterprise restructuring  associated  with substantial  job  market flexibility  by analyzing job reallocation,  worker
turnover.  At the same time, unemployment  in Lithuania  transitions across  labor force  states, wage distribution,
is high  and of long duration. This presents a  puzzle:  high  and regulatory constraints faced by employers.  He
job turnover  epitomizes labor market flexibility, while  focuses  on the issue of job creation  and job destruction,
high  unemployment  indicates labor market rigidities.  using micro level data on all  registered firms.  He finds
What are  the reasons  behind this paradox? Why do the  that flexibility in one dimension  can concur  with
unemployed  not benefit  from job opportunities  created  rigidities in the other.  Specifically,  employers in
by high job turnover,  which  entails high rates of job  Lithuania have  a substantial degree  of flexibility with
creation  and hiring?  employment  adjustment coupled with limited flexibility
To answer this question,  Rutkowski  looks at three  to wage adjustment due to a high statutory minimum
perspectives  on labor market flexibility:  wage.  The relatively  rigid wage structure  locks low
* The macroeconomic  perspective-A  flexible  labor  productivity  workers who are preponderant  among the
market  is one that facilitates full use and efficient  unemployed.  The low-skilled  long-term unemployed
allocation  of labor resources.  have become  marginahzed  and unable  to successfully
* The worker perspective-A  flexible  labor market  compete for available jobs, while the high job turnover is
means ease  in  finding a job paying a wage  adequate to  accounted  for largely by job-to-job  transitions.  As a
the worker's  effort and skills.  result,  a dynamic  labor market coincides with a stagnant
* The employer perspective-A  flexible labor market  unemployment  pool.
does not unduly constrain  the employer's  ability to adjust
employment  and wages to changing  market conditions.
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The  labor  market  in  Lithuania  is  characterized,  on  the  one  hand,  by  high
unemployment  and  high job  flows,  and by a high job  creation rate,  on the  other.  The
forner points out labor market rigidities, the latter indicates labor market dynamics.  This
paper  looks  at this puzzle  with  the  objective  of assessing  the  degree  of labor market
flexibility in  Lithuania,  given  the  advanced  stage  of economic  transition  (in  the  early
2000s).
The issue of labor market flexibility is particularly important for Lithuania  since
operating  a  currency  board  it  cannot  use  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policy  to
accommodate  external  adverse  shocks  (such  as the  1998  Russia crisis).  Similarly,  the
imminent  EU  accession  will  constitute  a  shock  to  the  economy,  which  will  put  a
considerable strain on the labor market.  This calls for substantial labor market flexibility
to  minimize  the  costs  of adjustment.  In  this context,  is  the Lithuanian  labor  market
flexible enough to facilitate economic restructuring  associated  with the EU accession and
subsequent integration?
We find that there is a substantial  degree of flexibility in terms of employment
adjustment,  but there is less flexibility in terms of wage adjustment.  This implies a fast
pace of enterprise restructuring,  productivity gains and eventually  economic growth.  At
the same time this implies that the  growth in output does not translate in the growth  of
employment,  and a large pool of low-productivity workers are locked out of employment
due to wage rigidities.
The paper is organized as follows.  Part I introduces  the concept of labor market
flexibility.  Part II looks at labor market flexibility from a macro-economic  perspective.
Part  III  examines  flexibility from the worker's point  of view focusing  on job security,
earnings  inequalities,  and chances  and costs of finding new employment.  Part IV deals
with institutional  and  regulatory constraints  to employment  and wage adjustment  faced
by the employer.  Part V concludes.I.  THE CONCEPT OF LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY
In general,  labor market flexibility means the ability of the  labor market to adjust
swiftly  to  changing  economic  conditions,  in  particular,  the  ability  to  absorb  various
external  "shocks"  hitting  the  economy.  How can one  gauge whether  or not the labor
market is flexible?  There is no single criterion of labor market flexibility,  as flexibility is
a multi-dimensional  phenomenon.  One can distinguish  there dimensions or perspectives
on  labor  market  flexibility:  macroeconomic  perspective,  employers  perspective  and
workers  perspective.  All three perspectives  are  inter-related  and  to  some  extent  may
overlap.  For  example,  flexibility  at  the  micro  level-the  level  of  an  enterprise-
translates into  flexibility  of an economy  as a whole.  Also,  wage dispersion  is another
issue which is relevant for all three perspectives.  Thus, one should bear in mind that this
categorization  is conventional,  but at the same time each dimension  can be characterized
by some separate  criteria.
From the  macroecononiic  perspective  a flexible  labor market  gives rise to  full
utilization  and  efficient  allocation  of labor  resources.  This  entails  high  labor  force
participation,  low  unemployment,  and  labor  mobility resulting  in  an efficient  structure
(industrial, occupational, regional,  etc.) of employment.  The prerequisite of the latter is a
process  known  as  "creative  destruction",  that is reallocation  of jobs  from  the declining
firms and industries to the expanding  ones.
From the worker perspective  a flexible  labor market means  an ease in finding a
gainful employment.  This entails  availability  of information  on job opportunities,  low
mobility costs (including regional mobility and the acquisition of  new skills necessary for
occupational  mobility),  and  a  short  duration  of job  search  resulting  in  a  satisfactory
worker-job  match.  Although in  a flexible  labor  market  the probability  of job  loss  is
relatively high, the costs of joblessness are relatively low, as unemployment  spells tend to
be of short duration and there are high chances of finding a new job.
From  the  employer  perspective,  a  flexible  labor  market  does  not  unduly
constrain the employer's ability to adjust the size and the composition of their workforce
as well as wages to changes in product demand.
2Employers and workers  would probably  agree whether or not the labor market is
flexible,  but  they  could disagree  on the assessment of labor market  flexibility.  While
employers  would  probably  unambiguously  prefer  more  flexible  labor  markets,  some
workers-especially  the insiders, i.e., those with secure jobs-may prefer higher degree
of  employment  protection.  However,  those  workers  who  are  unemployed-the
outsiders-could prefer to look for jobs in a dynamic  labor market,  where their chances
of finding work are better,  and unemployment spells are shorter.
From the view point of macroeconomic  performance  flexible labor markets tend
deliver better outcomes.  This point was forcefully made  in the influential  OECD  Jobs
Study (1994), and since than has been further supported by additional empirical  evidence.
For example,  Boeri  et al. (2000)  found that countries  with tight employment protection
legislation  tend to have lower employment  rates.  Garibaldi  and  Mauro  (1999) provide
evidence  that  flexible  employment  protection  legislation  is  associated  with  high job
creation.  Di Tella and McCullloch  (1998) show, based on the assessment of labor market
flexibility by employers,  that a more flexible labor market leads to lower unemployment
rates  and  to  a lower  proportion  of long-term  unemployed  in the  unemployment  pool.
Moreover,  rigid  labor  markets  produce  "jobless  recoveries,"  introduce  unemployment
persistence,  and reduce  the country's vulnerability  to external  shocks.  Recent work by
Blanchard  (2000)  and  Bertola  et  al.  (2001)  provides  further  theoretical  and  empirical
support  to the proposition  that flexible  labor market institutions reduce  unemployment,
particularly  of long-term  nature.  This  is  thanks to  greater  wage flexibility  and  higher
labor turnover associated with less regulated  labor markets.  Accordingly,  it is real  and
relative  wages,  rather  than  employment,  that bear  the  brunt  of adjustment  to  adverse
shocks.  In  addition,  high labor turnover decreases  the average time a worker spends  in
unemployment.  Thus, flexible labor-market  institutions  positively influence the speed at
which  an  economy  can  return  to  its  equilibrium  rate  of unemployment  following  a
negative shock.  By contrast,  it takes a regulated  labor market much longer to get back to
its equilibrium unemployment rate after a shock.
Measuring labor market flexibility is not easy for three reasons.  First, there is no
single indicator  that would  capture all  dimensions  of flexibility.  As a result,  different
measures  of  flexibility  usually  produce  different  and  sometimes  inconsistent  results,
3which  may create  ambiguity  and  in  some  cases  makes  a  definite  assessment of labor
market flexibility difficult.  Second, existing partial indicators (such as various indices of
the  strictness  of  employment  protection  legislation)  are  imperfect  proxies  for  the
phenomena they intend to measure.  This implies that the assessment of flexibility  is of
an approximate character  and can be inaccurate.  Third, quality of data used to construct
an indicator can be poor.  For example, job turnover can be deemed a good indicator of
labor market dynamics, however available data sets tend to be flawed and not comparable
across  countries.  This  means  that  there  is  no  reliable  yardstick  and  the measures  of
flexibility are subject to a possibly wide margin of error.
With  all  these  caveats  in  mind,  this  study  relies  on  a  series  of widely  used
indicators  of labor  market  flexibility  relating  to  its  various  aspects.  Specifically,  in
assessing  the  macroeconomic  dimension  of  labor  market  flexibility  we  will  utiLize
aggregate indicators of labor supply and job reallocation.  From the workers'  perspective
we will examine  labor market dynamics  by analyzing labor  flows and determining  the
risk of loosing a job and chances to find a new one.  In this part of the paper we will also
address  the issue of wage inequality.  Finally, we will look  at labor market  flexibility
from  the  employers'  point  of  view  by  analyzing  existing.  regulations  governing
employment  and  wage  protection.  However,  we  will  use  the  results  of  earlier
"macroeconomic"  analysis to see if legal constraints on flexibility are actually biding.  As
already  mentioned,  all three  perspectives  are  interrelated  and  to some  extent  overlap.
Thus, in the concluding section we will try to give a summary assessment of labor market
flexibility in Lithuania.
4II.  MACROECONOMIC  PERSPECTIVE:  RESTRUCTURING WITH UNDERUTILIZATION
OF LABOR RESOURCES
This section presents the major labor market developments  in Lithuania  from the
mid 1  990s until present, and assess the labor market performance from a macroeconomic
perspective.  First, the evolution of main labor market variables (employment, wages  and
productivity)  is described,  and various  measures of the utilization of labor resources  are
presented.  Next, we turn to the analysis  of job creation and job destruction, which is the
focus of this section.  By looking at job reallocation  we aim at determining the degree of
labor market flexibility and dynamics in Lithuania.
The  findings  suggest  that  the  labor  market  in  Lithuania  tends  to  be  slack,  as
witnessed  by low utilization  levels  of labor resources,  and that the  economy  has been
undergoing  far  reaching  restructuring  associated  with  a high  rate  of job  reallocation,
which points to substantial labor market flexibility.
Key Trends and Outcomes
Labor  market  developments-the  trends  in  employment  and  wages-are  to  a
large  extent  influenced  by  the  overall  level  of  economic  activity  and  the  aggregate
demand,  as measured by GDP.  This reflects  the fact that labor demand is derived from
product demand (i.e., is determined by consumers'  demands for fnal goods and services).
Since  1996 the GDP growth in Lithuania  has been positive, with the exception of
1999 when  GDP fell in the wake of the Russian crisis.  Overall,  GDP is currently  some
20 percent higher than in  1995.  However,  this positive  output trend has not translated
into  employment  growth,  and  employment  is currently  slightly  (2 percent)  below  that
reported in  1995  (Table  1).  This phenomenon, called 'jobless  growth", is not specific to
Lithuania,  instead is typical of most transition economies  of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE).  The  prima  facie  reason  for  economic  growth not  coupled  with  employment
growth  is productivity improvements.  Indeed,  as  Table  1 documents,  growth  in labor
productivity (measured  as GDP per worker)  has been quite strong since  1996,  averaging
3.6 percent per  year.  Thus,  economic  growth  in Lithuania has been achieved  through
more efficient  utilization of labor resources rather than through an increased  use of labor
5inputs.  A deeper reason for the jobless growth in transition economies in general  and in
Lithuania in particular, is the process of overcoming the legacy of overmanning,  inherited
from  the  communist  past.  Many  companies  entered  the  transition  with  employment
above that justified  by production  requirements.  A growing  exposure  to domestic  and
international  competition  coupled  the  influx  of  new  and  more  capital  intensive
technologies has led companies to rationalize employment and shed labor.  This process
has  been  spread  over  time.  Although  (as  we  will  show  later)  the  destruction  of
unproductive jobs has been coupled with the creation of new and more productive jobs,
job losses have exceeded job gains, leading to a net fall in employment.
Table 1 Dynamics of GDP, Employment, Productivity and Wages,  (1995=100)
Average
annual rate
1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  of  growth
(1995-2000),
GDPgrowth  105  112  118  113  118  3.3
Employment growth  101  102  101  100  96  -0.7
Productivity growth  104  111  117  113  122  4.1
Real wage growth  103  119  136  143  144  7.6
Note:  Real wage growth is based on gross earnngs.
Source:  Statistics Lithuania,  Bank staff  calculations.
In  the  long-run,  productivity  improvements  can  be  conducive  to  employment
growth as ceteris paribus  they imply a decrease  in unit labor  costs and thus an increase
labor demand.'  However,  this potentially positive effect hinges on the development  of
wages.  If wages grow faster than productivity,  unit labor cost increases  with detrimental
effects on labor demand.  That is what is happening  in Lithuania.  Since  1996 real wages
have  grown  by  7.6  percent  per  year,  outpacing  labor  productivity  growth  by  a large
margin.  This  implies an  increase  in  labor costs  and  may have  contributed  to jobless
growth.  So  far,  the  benefits  of economic  growth  that  has  occurred  since  1996  have
materialized in the form of higher wages rather than higher employment.
l  A  relevant  measure  is  so  called  total factor  productivity  (tfp),  which  reflects  technological  progress,  however
estimating tfp would go beyond the scope of  this paper.
6The  lack of employment  growth  is  only  one sign of labor market  problems  in
Lithuania  and  in  fact,  there  are  more  severe  ones.  The  labor  market  slack  has  been
substantial and labor supply has declined.  Specifically, the unemployment rate peaked at
17 percent, and after some temporary decline in  1997-1999 is on the rise again.  A more
general  measure  of labor  market  conditions,  the  ratio of employment  to  working  age
population  (the  employment  rate),  has  deteriorated  substantially  (a 4 percentage points
decline)  over the  period  1995-2000  (Table  2).  The  labor  force  participation  rate  has
declined even more (by over 6 percentage points).  In addition, unemployment tends to be
of long duration  as over 50 percent of the unemployed have been jobless for more than a
year.
Table 2  Labor Force, 1995-2000
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Labor force participation rate  66.9  65.4  61.5  61.7  61.9  60.4
Employment  rate  55.2  54.6  52.8  53.5  53.2  512
Unemployment rate  17.1  16.4  14.1  13.3  14.1  15.4
Share of long-term unemployed  ..  ..  ..  55  38.7  52.3
Definitions: Labor force participation rate = labor force/population  aged 14 or more ratio.
Employment rate = employment/population aged  14 or more ratio.
Unemployment rate = unemployment/labor force ratio.
Labor force = employment plus unemployment.
Source: Laborforce, employment and  unemployment 1997-2000 (Laborforce  survey results). Statistcs  Lithuania,
Vilnius 2001.
These  negative  trends  over  recent  years  have  led  to  a  significant
underemployment  of labor  resources.  The  Lithuanian  employment  rate-a summary
measure  of the  degree  of utilization  of labor  resources-is  much  below  the  OECD
2 average.  While only  57 percent of persons of working age  are employed  in Lithuania,
the  OECD  average  employment  rate  is  66 percent  (Table  3).  This  means  that  about
9 percent of working-age  persons in Lithuania  who could  have been employed  are not,
and are either unemployed  or out of the labor force.  This is a considerable  social  loss,
which  translates  into  lower  than  potential  GDP.
2  The employment rate is the ratio of employment to working age population,  where in line with OECD practice,  the
working age is taken as  15 to 64.
7Table 3 Unanployment, Labor Force Participation and Employment Rates by Age and Gender (%)
All workers  Men  Women
15to64  15to24  25to54  55to64  15to24  25to54  55to64  15to24  25to54  55to64
Lithuania (May 2001)
Unemployment rate  17.2  32.7  15.7  12.3  36.0  17.5  16.1  27.6  13.8  7.7
Labor force participation rate  68.7  31.4  87.2  23.3  37.5  90.3  33.6  25.2  84.2  16.9
Employment rate  56.8  21.2  73.5  20.4  24.0  74.5  28.2  18.2  72.5  15.6
OECD (1999)
Unemployment rate  6.4  11.8  5.4  5.2  11.7  4.9  5.6  11.9  6.1  4.6
Labor force participation rate  70.4  53.0  80.3  51.6  57.8  93.0  64.5  48.0  67.8  39.4
Employment rate  65.9  46.7  75.9  48.9  51.1  88.5  60.8  42.3  63.6  37.6
Source: Lithuania:  Labor Force  Survey, May 2001; Bank staffcalculations.
OECD: Employment Outlook 2000.
8Apart  form  high  overall  unemployment,  two  factors  contribute  to  the  low
employment  rate in  Lithuania.  The first is  low labor  force participation  among young
workers  (aged  15 to 24).  The second factor is low labor force participation  among older
workers (aged 55 to 64).  For example,  the  Lithuanian labor force participation  rate for
young workers is 21 percent against the 47 percent OECD average.  Similarly, labor force
participation  rate for older workers  is 20 percent against the 49 percent OECD  average.
In  addition,  for both  those  worker groups  unemployment  rates  in Lithuania  are  much
higher than in the OECD.  In contrast,  the  employment  rate for prime  age workers  is
similar  to the  OECD  average  (74  percent  against  76 percent).  However,  behind  this
similarity  there are significant  differences  in employment  by gender.  In  Lithuania the
employment  rate  for  prime-age  men  is  significantly  lower  than  the  OECD  average
(75 percent  against  89  percent), while  the  employment  rate  for women  is substantially
above the average  (73 percent against  64 percent).  The low employment  rate for prime
age men  is the result of the high  relative unemployment rate  (17.5 percent), rather  than
low labor force participation rate.
The above data suggests  that there is substantial room to increase labor supply in
Lithuania.  This includes  higher labor force participation  by young  and  older workers,
whose productive potential is not fully utilized.  It should be stressed, that the increase in
labor supply does not entail an increase in unemployment (as the decrease in labor supply
does not imply the decrease  in unemployment).  In general,  employment growth is in line
with the growth of the labor force, and thus the number of jobs is not fixed-contrary to
the common "lump of labor"  fallacy (Krueger  and Pischke,  1997).  More effective labor
supply  is  one  way  to  raise  a  country's  GDP.  Admittedly  however,  labor  supply is
inversely  related  to  the  degree  of  slack  in  the  labor  market,  and  in  particular  to
unemployment rate (through the so called "discouraged worker" effect).
Another  aspect  of overall  labor  market  performance  is  regional  variations  in
unemployment.  High regional  dispersion  of unemployment  rates  points to a structural
dimension  of unemployment  and  to  barriers  to  labor  mobility.  Apparently,  these
problems  are  not  pronounced  in  Lithuania.  There  is  noticeably  little  variation  in
unemployment  rates across the ten major administrative  regions (Table 4).  The highest
unemployment rate of 18.4 percent was observed  in 2000 in the Siauliai region while the
9lowest rates were observed in the Utena (13.6 percent)  and Taurage  (13.7) regions.  By
all  standards  the  spread  is  very  limited.  There  is probably  more  variation  at  lower
territorial levels,  but given the small  size  of the  country it is  questionable  whether they
form separate  labor markets.  In this  context,  improved labor  mobility seems to be of
limited  importance  as  an  equilibrating  mechanism.  While  higher geographical  labor
mobility could  be still desirable  for better allocation  of labor,  it cannot be  expected to
significantly lower unemployment.  In other words, even if labor mobility is low, it does
not seem to be an important source of labor market rigidities in Lithuania.
Table 4  Unemployment  Rate by Region,  2000
Region  Unemployment rate











Source  Laborforce, employment and  unemployment (survey data) 1997-2000, Statistics  Lithuania, Vilnius 2001.
Overall,  the  central  labor  market  problem  in  Lithuania  is  the  low  level  of
utilization of labor resources,  which means that the output level is lower than potential.
Unemployment  is  high  an  of  long-duration,  and  labor  force  participation  is  low,
especially among young and older workers.  As a result, the overall  employment  rate is
low  by OECD standards.  Despite economic  growth which  Lithuania has enjoyed  since
the mid 1990s, the labor market slack has not diminished.  One possible reason is a strong
increase  in real wages,  which  has far outpaced  productivity  growth,  thus  leading to an
increase in labor costs.
10Job Creation and Job Destruction
The  purpose  analyzing  the  issue  of job  creation  and  job  destruction  is  to
determine how flexible  is the labor market in Lithuania from the viewpoint of allocative
efficiency.  Allocative  efficiency  calls  for  reallocation  of labor  from  less  to  more
productive  uses  and  thus  entails  labor turnover.  Conversely,  high job  turnover-high
rates of job creation and job destruction-implies  two things.  First, that hiring and firing
costs do not prevent firms from restructuring, and thus that there is a necessary degree of
labor  market  flexibility.  Second,  assuming  that jobs  that  were  destroyed  were  low
productivity jobs and jobs that were created were higher productivity jobs, job turnover is
associated with productivity gains and thus with higher efficiency.  As such, job turnover
is an indicator of labor market flexibility and restructuring.  High job turnover indicates a
dynamic labor market, while low job turnover points to potential rigidities and barriers to
restructuring.
Our  basic measure  of labor  market  restructuring  and  flexibility will be  what  is
called "excess job reallocation."  This measure shows the extent of job turnover beyond
that  necessary  to  accommodate  net changes  in  employment.  Technically,  the rate  of
excess job reallocation is the difference between the job turnover rate (which is the sum
of the job creation  and the job destruction rates) and net employment growth.3 The rate
of  excess job  reallocation  shows  the  percentage  of jobs  that  were  reallocated  from
declining  firms  to  expanding  firms.  For  example,  the  excess job  reallocation  rate  of
24percent  means  that  12  percent  (24/2)  of jobs  were  reallocated  from  firms  which
reduced  employment  to  firms which  increased  employment.  It is worth noting  that the
excess job reallocation  is determined  by the lesser of job  creation  and job  destruction
rates.4
3  The primary  concepts  underlying  the measurement  of labor market  flexibility  are those  of job  creation and job
destruction,  while other measures  are derived from them.  Specific  definitions are as follows.  The gross  job creation
rate is measured  as the sum of all employment gains in  expandmg firms m a given year, dhvided by total employment at
the beginning of the year.  The gross  job destruction rate is defined  as the sum of all employment  losses in  contracting
firms  in a given  year divided  by total employment.  The sum  of gross job  creation  and gross job destruction  gives a
measure of gross  job turnover (reallocation), and the difference yields the net employment growth rate.  The excess job
reallocation  rate is defined as the job reallocation rate minus the absolute value of net employment growth.
4  Specifically,  EJR/2 = mm {JC, JD),  where EJR is the excess job reallocation  rate, JC is the job creation rate and JD is
the job destruction rate.
11High Job Turnover
How high is job turnover  in Lithuania?  To answer this question we will compare
the  rate  of job  turnover  (reallocation)  in  Lithuania  to  those  observed  in  some  other
transition economies  and selected OECD countries (Table 5).5  It turns out that Lithuania
has  by  far  the  highest rate  of job  turnover  among  both  the  transition  economies  and
mature market  economies.  The average rate of job creation in Lithuania  over the period
1996-2000  was  13 percent and the average rate of job destruction was  16.1 percent.  This
gives the rate of job turnover of 29 percent  and the rate of excess job reallocation of 25
percent.  Similarly high rate of job creation as in Lithuania was observed only in the US,
and among the transition economies in Russia in the late 1990s.  The rate of job creation
in  Lithuania  was  markedly  higher  than  in  Poland  (by  3 percentage  points)  and
considerably  higher  than  in  Slovakia  (by  11  percentage  points).  However,  the job
destruction  rate was also  considerably  higher  in Lithuania  than in  other countries.  For
example,  the job destruction rate was in Lithuania  some  5 percentage  points higher than
in Poland, 6 percentage points higher than in the U.S., and as much as 9 percentage points
higher than in Slovakia.  Obviously, high job creation  and job destruction means that job
turnover in Lithuania was well above that observed in mature market economies and even
that in  fast restructuring  transition  economies.  To illustrate,  the excess job reallocation
was in Lithuania by over 5 percentage points higher than in Poland by over 20 percentage
points higher than in Slovakia.
5  International comparnsons  ofjob tumover are subject to a wide margin of error due to limited data comparability.  In
particular,  data on firm  entry and exit tends to be inaccurate and treatment of this data varies from country  to country.
However,  as  Table  5 documents,  the differences  between  all  considered  measures  of job turnover  in Lithuania  and
other countries are so large that it is highly unlikely that they are spurious and due to statistical  errors  Accordingly, the
results of the comparison  seem  robust and not affected  by measurement problems  to the extent  which  could alter the
conclusions.
12Table 5  Job Creation and Job Destruction:  Lithuania Against Selected Countries
(as percentage  of total employment)
Transition economies  OECD economies
United
Lithuania  Poland  Russia  Slovakia France  Germany
States
1998-99  1998-99  1998-99  1997-98  1984-91  1983-90  1984-91
Job creation rate  13.6  9.7  12.2  2.0  12.7  9.0  13.0
Openings  3.8  4.4  6.1  2.5  8.4
Expansions  9.7  5.3  6.6  6.5  4.6
Jobdestructionrate  17.7  11.5  13.8  6.9  11.8  7.5  10.4
Closures  7.0  1.4  5.5  1.9  7.3
Contractions  10.7  10.1  6.3  5.6  3.1
Net  employment  change  -4.1  -1.8  -1.6  -4.9  0.9  1.5  2.6
Continuing establishments only  -0.9  -4.8  0.3  0.9  1.5
Job turnover rate  31.2  21.2  26.0  8.9  22.4  16.5  23.4
Continuing establishments  only  20.4  15.4  12.9  12.1  7.7
Excess job reallocation rate  27.1  19.4  24.4  4.0  21.5  15.0  20.8
Continuing establishments only  19.4  10.5  12.6  11.2  6.2
Note:  data for OECD countries are yearly averages, data for transition economies refer only to one year.
Sources: Lithuania:  Annual survey of wages and  salaries  (DA-03),  vanousyears, Bank staff  calculations.
Poland: World Bank (2001b)
Russia: Broadman and Recanatini (2001)
Slovalaa. WorldBank(200Ic)
OECD countries OECD (1996)
All these clearly indicate that Lithuania has been undergoing  a process of fast and
very  intensive  enterprise  restructuring,  which  is  hardly paralleled  by any transition  or
mature  market  economy.  This  process  has  been  associated  with  a considerable  job
turnover,  far exceeding that observed  in most other countries.  Each year there is a large
number of new jobs being created,  and simultaneously,  an even larger number of old jobs
is being  destroyed.  This implies a decline  in  the overall  number of jobs,  but also  far-
reaching  reallocation  of jobs  from  less  to,  presumably,  more  productive  uses.  This
process  of intensive  and  fast job reallocation  indicates  a dynamic  labor  market,  with  a
13significant  amount of flexibility,  which is a prerequisite of successful  restructuring.  In
other words, labor market in Lithuania seems flexible  enough to enable  what has been  a
dramatic reallocation ofjobs and labor.
Persistence of High Job Reallocation
The  process  of  intensive  enterprise  restructuring,  as  witnessed  by  high  job
turnover rates,  has been under way uninterrupted  since at least the mid 1990s (Table 6).6
There was some variation  in job turnover rates over the period  1996-2000,  however  it
was relatively  small,  and  even when job turnover reached  its  lowest point,  it was  still
high  by international  standards.  When  job turnover was  at  its peak (1996-1997),  the
excess job reallocation rate was 28 percent, while when job turnover reached its trough
(1999-2000)  the rate was still 21 percent, meaning that as much as over ten percent of all
jobs were reallocated from shrinking finns to expanding firms.  Despite some slow-down,
intensive job reallocation continues in Lithuania.
Table 6  Job Creation and Job Destruction in Lithuania, 1996-2000
1996-97  1997-98  1998-99  1999-2000
Job creation rate  14.0  14.0  13.6  10.5
Openings  5.2  4.0  3.8  3.6
Expansions  8.8  10.0  9.7  6.9
Job destruction rate  19.3  12.4  17.7  15.1
Closures  7.5  1.9  7.0  1.9
Contractions  11.9  10.5  10.7  13.2
Net employment change  -5.3  1.6  -4.1  -4.6
Continuing establishments  only  -3.0  -0.4  -0.9  -6.3
Job turnover rate  33.4  26.3  31.2  25.6
Continuing establishments  only  20.7  20.5  20.4  20.1
Excess job reallocation rate  28.1  24.7  27.1  21.0
Continuing establishments  only  17.7  20.0  19.4  13.8
Source: Annual  survey of wages and  salaries, various  years, Bank staff  calculations.
6 There  are no data on job turover available for the penod before the 1996.
14The time variation  of job destruction has been higher than that of job creation  in
Lithuania, which is a typical phenomenon observed also in developed market economies.
For  example,  while  the  difference  between  the highest  and  the  lowest job destruction
rates was 7  percentage  points during the period under question,  the  difference  between
the highest  and  the  lowest job  creation  rates  was  less  than  4  percentage  points.  Job
destruction  has  been  more  sensitive  to  changes  in  economic  conditions  than  is  job
creation.  Accordingly,  the time  variation of job turnover in  Lithuania has been  largely
accounted for by variation in job destruction.
The Pattern  of Job Turnover
Let us  now  focus  on  the  structure  of job  turnover.  First, job  destruction  has
tended to exceed job creation,  which has led to  a fall in employment.7 This implies that
the extent of excess job reallocation  in Lithuania has  been  limited  by job destruction.
The number of jobs reallocated was equal to the number of new jobs that were created.
Second,  gross job creation  has  taken place  mostly  in  existing  firms.  This  is a
typical pattern in several  economies (in the U.S.,  instead, it is new entrants which tend to
create most of new jobs.  Still, new entrants  played a significant part in job creation  in
Lithuania,  too.  For example,  out of  nearly  11  percent of new jobs that were created  in
1999-2000,  7  percent were  created owing to expansions  of existing  firms,  and close  to
4 percent were due to the entry of new businesses.
Third, job destruction  occurs mainly in existing firns, while firm closures play a
secondary,  although non-eligible,  role.8 For example,  out of 15  percent of all jobs that
were destroyed in 1999-2000,  less than 2 percent were lost due to firm closures, and over
13 percent  owing  to reductions  in  employment  by  existing  firms.  It should  be noted,
however, that in the aftermath of the Russian crisis (1998-1999),  firm closures  accounted
for a substantial  part of job  destruction.  So, an increased proportion of jobs lost due to
7  The data  on  employment growth  presented  in  Table  6 are not  consistent  with  published  data  on employment  in
Lithuania.  Specifically,  data on job  destruction  and job  creation  imply larger than  official  loss in  employment  than.
This can be due to the fact that data presented here do not cover all sectors of the economy (e.g., agriculture,  public and
social services).
8  Firm closures are usually substantially underrepresented  in most surveys, however this does not seem to be the case
in Lithuania, where the statistical  agency takes  effort to determine in each  case whether a non-response  is due to firm
closure or to a refusal  to respond.
15firm  closures  seems  to point to  an  external  shock.  Otherwise,  adjustment  consists  of
changes in the employment level.
The Role of Employer Characteristics
Job turnover tends  to be higher in  small private finns located in  more dynamic
industries  and  regions.  In  the proceeding  part of this  section  we  will  document  this
assertion.
Firm size
Job turnover is substantially higher in  small than in large firms.  For illustration,
in  firms  with  up  to  10  workers  the job  creation  rate  approaches  20 percent,  the job
destruction rate is almost 25 percent  and close to 20 percent of  jobs are reallocated from
contracting  to  expanding  firms  (Table  7).  In contrast,  in the  largest  firms  (with over
1,000 employees)  the job creation  rate is less than  1 percent, the job destruction rate is
10 percent and thus job turnover is much lower than in small firms.
Table 7 Job Turnover by Firm Size,  1999-2000
Job destruction  Net employment  Excess job
Finn size  Job creation rate  Job turnover rate
rate  growth  reallocation rate
Micro  19.3  23.1  42.5  -3.8  38.7
Small  9.3  19.7  28.9  -10.4  18.6
Medium  5.3  16.0  21.3  -10.7  10.6
Large  7.1  9.6  16.7  -2.5  14.2
Extra large  0.7  9.9  10.6  -9.2  1.3
Note:  Micro:  I-10 employees
Small: 11-50 employees
Medium:  51-250 employees
Large: 251-1,000 employees
Extra large:  1,00I+ employees
Classification is based on the employment  level in the mitial year.
Source: Annual survey of wages and salaries,  1999 and 2000, Bank staff calculations.
Are then small firms the engine of employment  growth?  The answer is qualified
yes.  It is business start-ups  and small firms which jointly create a bulk of new jobs.  By
16itself, small firms lack the "critical mass" to create a very large number of jobs.  First, the
share of small firms in employment  is limited.  Second, the high job creation rate in small
firms  does not necessarily  translate  into large absolute numbers  of newly created jobs.
By  definition,  in small  firms  a  relatively  modest  increase  in  employment  in  absolute
terms means a substantial  growth rate.  Altogether,  small firms (up to 50 employees)  in
Lithuania create almost 40 percent of all new jobs (Figure  1).  This is a lot, but still this is
a minority of new jobs.  Only together with business start-ups (which as a rule are small)
small firms crate the bulk-over 70 percent-of new jobs.  Thus, business star-ups play a
critical part in job creation:  by themselves, they create over one-third on new jobs.










Start-ups  Micro  Small  Medium  Large  Extra large
|  IShare in job creation  * Share in job destruction  O Share in emplomn|
The  key part played  in job  creation  by business  start-ups  and  small  frms  has
important  policy  implications.  It  points  to  the  critical  role  of competitive  product
markets,  lack  of barriers  to  entry  and  favorable  investment  climate  for  employment
growth.
Wage  level
Labor  demand  is a function  of wages.  Given a production  level,  higher wages
imply lower demand for labor.  Lower  labor demand,  in turn,  is likely to translate  into
lower rates of  job creation and higher rates of  job destruction.  Do low-wage firms indeed
create more and destroy less jobs than high wage  firms?  We provide a tentative  answer
17to this question by looking at the relationship between job flows and the wage level paid
by firms.9
indeed  it  seems  that  in  Lithuanian  lower  wages  are  conducive  to  higher  job
creation,  however they do not hamper job destruction.  Still, the net employment growth
is visibly higher in low-wage firms than in high wage firms (Table 8).  Specifically, there
is  a  marked  inverse  relationship  between  the  wage  level  and job  creation.  The job
creation rate in low-wage firms  (bottom quartile) at 21  percent is over twice as high as in
high-wage  firms  (top  quartile),  where  it  amounts  to  8  percent.  However,  the job
destruction  rate  tends  to be  also  higher in  low-wage  than  in  high-wage  firms.  This
implies  that  job  turnover  is  particularly  high  in  low-wage  firms  (39  percent)  and
relatively low in high-wage  firms (19 percent),  which is what one would have expected.
Importantly,  employment  growth in  low-wage  firms  is positive  (1.7  percent per year),
while  it is negative  in high-wage  firms (-2.9 percent).  This  is supportive  of the  initial
hypothesis that  labor demand is inversely related to the wage level.  It should be noted
that the  wage level  is correlated  with the firm's  size, and thus the relationship  between
wages and job flows also reflects the earlier described relationship between job flows and
firm size.
9 The answer  is tentative as we do not control for the impact of other variables  which affect both jobs flows and wages,
such as productivity, human capital, or firm size.
18Table 8  Job Tumover by Wage Quartile, 1999-2000
Job creation  Job destruction  Job turnover  Net employment  Excess job
Wage quartile
rate  rate  rate  growth  reallocation rate
First  20.6  18.8  39.4  1.7  37.7
Second  15.6  17.9  33.5  -2.3  31.2
Third  10.9  16.0  26.9  -5.1  21.8
Fourth  8.1  10.9  19.0  -2.9  16.1
Note:  Firms are ranked by the average wage level and then categorized into quartile groups.
Source  Annual survey of  wages and salaries, 1999 and  2000. Bank staffcalculations.
In  sum,  low-wage  firms  are  characterized  by  high job  creation,  employment
growth  and substantial job turnover.  In contrast,  high-wage  firms create  relatively few
jobs, tend to reduce employment, but are characterized by relatively low job turnover.
Industry
This  section  identifies  industries  which  are  expanding  and declining  as  well  as
those which undergo the most intensive restructuring.  A look at correlations  between the
components ofjob turnover will help identify patterns of industrial restructuring.  Finally,
it will be determined if job reallocation and thus restructuring takes place mainly between
industries or within industries.
Where  are jobs being created?  Table 9,  Panel A presents top  10 industries with
the highest rates  of job  creation.  As expected,  the highest job creation rates  are in the
service  and trade sectors, which were relatively underdeveloped  in Lithuania.  Financial
intermediation  stands  out  as  the  biggest  job  creator,  followed  by trade  and  so  called
"other business activities",  which include legal services,  accounting, business counseling,
marketing, personnel  recruitment, etc.  These are all activities which form a foundation of
a developing  market economy.  However,  high job creation is not limited to the service
and  trade  sectors,  but  it  also  occurs  in  the  manufacturing  industry,  such  as  in
manufacturing of wood products and furniture, and manufacturing of plastic products.
19The top  10  industries  in job destruction  include construction,  insurance and real
estate  (somewhat  surprisingly),  manufacturing  of  mineral  products,  and  hotels  and
restaurants  (Table  9,  Panel  B).  It  is  clear  that  in  some  sectors  high job  destruction
coexists with  high job creation.  Such  high job  turnover,  restructuring  sectors  include
manufacturing  of wood  products,  wholesale  and  retail  trade,  recreations,  hotels  and
restaurants,  as well as car sales and repair (Table 9, Panel C).
In conclusion,  the fastest expanding sectors,  in which job creation  is much faster
than  job  destruction,  include  financial  intermediation  and  other  business  activities,
wholesale  trade,  as well as  some  manufacturing  activities:  manufacturing  of RTV and
communication  equipment  furniture  and wood products, and apparel  (Table 9, Panel D).
Among the most important declining industries,  which destroy large amount of jobs (both
in  absolute  terms  and  relative  to  their  employment)  are  construction,  real  estate  and
manufacturing  of mineral products.
20Table 9 Job Turnover by Industry, 1999-2000
A.  Top 10 industries with highest rates of job  B. Top 10 industries with highest rates of job
creation  destruction
Job creation  Share in  Job destruction  Share in
Industry  rate  employment  Industry  rate  employment
Financial  intermediation  60.7  1.1  Construction  19.9  12.0
Wholesale  trade  22.5  6.3  Insurance & pensions  18.2  0.6
Other business activities  19.9  2.7  Mineral products  17.8  1.9
Wood  18.5  2.6  Real estate  17.5  2.4
Recreation & culture  14.6  0.9  Hotels & restaurants  17.5  2.3
Hotels & restaurants  14.5  2.3  Car sale & repair  16.9  2.9
Car sale & repair  14.4  2.9  Wood  16.0  2.6
Furniture  14.3  1.9  Leather  15.8  0.5
Retail trade  13.9  9.0  Retail trade  15.5  9.0
Rubber & plastic  13.9  0.9  Recreation & culture  15.0  0.9
C.  Top 10 industries with highest excess job  D.  Top 10 industries with highest employment
reallocation  growth
Net
Excess job  Share in  Share in
Industry  reallocation  employment  Industry  employment
reallocation  employrnent  ~~~employment growth
Wood  32.0  2.6  Financial  intermed.  55.5  1.1
Wholesale trade  29.4  6.3  0th. business activities  9.8  2.7
Recreation & culture  29.3  0.9  Wholesale trade  7.8  6.3
Hotels & restaurants  29.0  2.3  RTV & communic.  5.2  1.3
Car sale & repair  28.8  2.9  Furniture  3.6  1.9
Retail trade  27.7  9.0  Apparel  2.7  5.0
Rubber & plastic  27.7  0.9  Wood  2.5  2.6
Insurance & pensions  25.1  0.6  Petroleum products  -0.1  0.6
Metal products  23.5  1.3  Recreation & culture  -0.4  0.9
Travel  22.9  1.9  Rubber & plastic  -0.5  0.9
Note: The ranking is based on mdustries whose share in total employment is at least 0.5 percent
This means that 18 industries with smallest employment are excluded.
Source. Annual survey of  wages and salaries, 1999 and 2000, Bank staff calculations.
21What is the impact of job flows and restructuring  on employment  growth in the
industrial  sector?  This is  an empirical question  because  as we have just seen, high job
destruction does not necessarily imply a fall in employment,  as high job creation does not
necessarily  imply  employment  growth.  It is  the joint  impact  of job  creation  and job
destruction  that  determines  changes  in  industry  employment.  It  turns  out  that  in
Lithuania employment growth within the industrial sector is strongly positively correlated
with job creation  (r=0.90)  but  weakly  negatively  with job  destruction  (r=-0.47).  The
latter  means  that  there  are  industries  where  employment  grows  despite  high  job
destruction.  At the same time there is a relatively weak (but  positive) correlation between
employment  growth  and  the  excess  job  reallocation  rate  (r=0.36).  This  is  a
counterintuitive  finding which  means  that  industry  restructuring  tends  to be  conducive
(not detrimental,  as usually assumed) to employment growth.
These  findings  have  two  important  policy  implications.  First,  employment
policies  should  focus  on creating  favorable  conditions  for job  creation  rather  than on
preventing job destruction  and protecting  unviable jobs.  Second,  contrary  to common
perception,  enterprise  restructuring  often  results  in employment  gains,  not losses,  and
thus should be encouraged rather than hampered.  In other words, enterprise restructuring
and  associated job  destruction  are  not detrimental  to  employment  as long  as  business
environment is conducive to job creation.  It is high job creation, not low job destruction,
that is key to employment growth.
Does  job  reallocation  in  Lithuania  take  place  mainly  between  or  within
industries?  This  is  an  important  issue,  which  defines  the  nature  of  industrial
restructuring.  The dominance of the between component of job turnover would point to
reallocation  of labor  resources  from  declining  industries  to  growing  ones,  while  the
dominance of the within component  would indicate that resources  are reallocated  from
contracting toward expanding firms within an industry.
One could have expected that the transition from a centrally planned  economy to
a  market  economy  (as  is  taking  place  in  Lithuania)  will  be  largely  associated  with
reallocation  of  resources  across  industries  in  order  to  compensate  the  inherited
misallocation problem.  It turns out that at the more advanced  stage of the transition this
22is not the case.  Although inter-industry employment  shifts still play an important part in
Lithuania,  they are dominated  by much  larger intra-industry  shifts.  Using the  standard
decomposition of the excess job reallocation  index (Davis and Haltiwanger,  1990),  once
finds that between industry job shifts account for 18 percent of the excess job reallocation
index  and  within  industry  shifts  account  for  the  remnaining  82  percent.  Hence,  the
dominant  form  of restructuring  in  Lithuania  consists  of intra-industry  reallocation  of
jobs.  This pattern of industrial restructuring observed in Lithuania (i.e., the dominance of
within  industry  job  shifts)  does  not  differ  from  that  of  other  advanced  transition
economies,  such  as  Poland  or  Slovakia,  nor  from  that  prevailing  in  mature  market
economies.  As in other market economies,  restructuring  in Lithuania takes place mainly
at the industry level, and consists of  reallocation  of jobs from less to more efficient firms
within the same industry.
Market concentration
Earlier  in  this  section  the  importance  of competitive  product  markets  for job
creation was emphasized.  First, discussed  above,  a large number of new jobs is created
by new entrants.  Second, according to standard  economic theory, monopolized markets
are characterized  by lower employment  than competitive  markets.  Here  we will try to
determine  if there  is  an  observable  link between  the  degree  of market  concentration
(inverse of competition) and job flows in Lithuania.
The results must be interpreted with great caution,  as the measure used (which is
based on the shares in industry employment by domestic  firms) is an imperfect proxy for
the degree  of product  market competition.  First and  most importantly,  it does not take
into account competition coming from foreign  firms.  Second,  it is assumed that a firm's
share in employment corresponds  to its share in sales.
With  these  caveat  in  mind,  there  is an  U-shaped  relationship  between  market
(employment)  concentration  and job  creation.  The job  creation  rate  is  highest  (over
11  percent) in industries in which market concentration  is low, and in industries in which
market  concentration  is  high,  being  markedly lower  (6 percent)  in industries  in  which
market concentration is moderate (Table 2.10).  The high job creation rate in industries in
which  market  concentration  is high  is  surprising,  since  as  one  can  recall, job  creation
23strongly depends on entry of new firms, while high degree of concentration  implies that
new entry is limited.  This means that in Lithuania job creation  must be high in existing
firms, which enjoy a significant degree of market power.'0
Table  10  Job Turnover and Concentration of Employment within Industry, 1990-
2000
Job destruction  Net employment  Excess job
Concentration  Job creation rate  Job turnover rate
rate  growth  reallocation rate
Low  11.3  16.4  27.7  -5.0  22.7
Moderate  5.9  12.8  18.7  -6.9  11.8
High  11.8  8.4  20.2  3.4  16.8
Note:  The degree of concentration  is measured by Herfindhal-Hirschman  Index (HHI) and is categorized  as follows:
Low = HHI is less than 1,000 points
Moderate = HHI between  1,000 and  1,800 points
High = HHI  in excess of 1,800 points
Source.  Annual survey of  wages and  salaries, 1999 and  2000, Bank staff  calculations.
The  pattern  of  job  destruction  is  different:  the  rate  of  job  destruction
monotonically decreases with market concentration.  It is lowest (8 percent)  in industries
where market concentration  is high, it is significantly higher (13 percent) in industries in
which  market  concentration  is  moderate  and  is  by  far  the  highest  (16  percent)  in
industries in which market concentration is low.
Consequently,  job  turnover  is  the  highest  in  industries  in  which  market
concentration  is  low  and  thus  competition  is  high,  which  is  what  one  would  have
expected.  Less  intuitive  is  the  finding  that job  turnover  is  the  lowest  in  industries
characterized by moderate degree  of market concentration.  Also the observed pattern of
employment  growth  depending  on  the  degree  of  competition  seems  surprising.
Employment grows  the  fastest in industries  in which  market concentration  is high  and
falls most rapidly in industries in which market concentration  is moderate.
10 This is broadly consistent with findings of Carlin et al (2001),  as the present  study finds that "some  market power
but not too much" has positive effects on sales and  productivity growth  and other indicators of firms performance.  In
their paper "some market power but not too much" occurs  when firms are facing one to three competitors,  which by our
measure would most probably translate mto high degree of market concentration.
24To conclude,  it seems that either high competition  or market power is cGnducive
for job creation,  while in industries where  firms  have only moderate  market power the
employment  performance  is  the worst.  The policy  implications  of these  findings  are
twofold.  First,  policies  aimed  at  fostering product  market  competition  are  compatible
with the objective ofjob creation and lead to more dynamic labor markets.  Second, good
employment performance of firms with market power barely means that protecting firms
from  competitive  pressure  can  stimulate  employment.  The critical  question  is  if this
situation is  sustainable  once  these firms  will become  exposed  to  more competition.  It
seems  rather unlikely  that  firms, which  have  been  sheltered  from competition,  will  be
able to become competitive and at the same time preserve employment.  Thus, protecting
firms from competition in order to preserve jobs does not seem a viable policy option.
Region
This section  focuses on regional  variation  in job  flows,  with the  following two
objectives.  First,  it  attempts  to  identify  dynamic,  high  turnover  regions,  as  well  as
stagnant, low turnover regions.  Second, it aims at determining the relative importance of
within and  between  region job flows.  The latter  issue  is relevant  for determining  the
extent  of regional  restructuring  and  the  extent  to  which  regions  in  Lithuania  form
separate labor markets.
Lithuania's regions differ with regard to job creation,  but hardly differ with regard
to job destruction.  The most  successful  regions  create  twice  as many jobs  (relative  to
their employment) as least successful one.  Specifically,  the job creation rate ranges from
about 6 percent in the Utena and Alytus regions, to 12 percent in the Vilnius (capital)  and
Kaunas regions.  However, as Figure 2 (Panel A) shows, the overall  regional variation in
job creation  is rather modest.  Even lesser is the regional variation of the job destruction
rate, which ranges from less than  11 percent in the Utena region, to over 16 percent in the
Marijampole region.  Leaving these extreme cases aside, in all remaining  regions the job
destruction rate varies around 14 percent (Figure 2, Panel B).
Given  that  in  all  Lithuania  regions  employment  has  contracted,  differences  in
excess  job  reallocation  reflect  differences  in  job  creation.  The  regions  that  have
restructured the most are those in which the job creation rate has been the highest.  Thus,
25labor markets are most vibrant in the Vilnius and Kaunas regions, and are stagnant in the
Utena and Alytus regions (Figure 2, Panel C).
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26Interestingly,  there  is  no  visible  relationship  between  regional  unemployment
rates and either the job creation rates or job destruction rates.  The unemployment rate is
similar  in  regions  with  higher job  creation  as  in  regions  with  lower  job  creation.
Similarly, regional  unemployment rates do not vary with job destruction rates.  A prima
facie  reason behind  this is  that there  is very little regional  variation  in  unemployment
rates  in Lithuania.  However,  why regional  unemployment  rates  do not respond to job
creation  and job destruction remains  an open question.  One possible explanation  is that
many workers move directly from old jobs to new jobs, without entering unemployment,
while hiring from the ranks of the unemployed is limited.
Are jobs reallocated  mainly between or within regions?  Given that employment
has fallen in all regions in Lithuania, there has been virtually no scope for reallocation  of
jobs  from declining  to expanding  regions.  Accordingly,  en masse job reallocation  has
happened  within  regions.  This  is  of  course  a  statistical  simplification,  however  it
highlights  the point that due  to an across the board employment  decline, there has been
little regional employment restructuring  in Lithuania.
Determinants of Job Creation
In the previous  section we  looked  at job turnover and  its components.  In this
section we will look at factors that cause firms to change employment level, in particular
to  create  new jobs.  We  aim  to  explain  firm  employment  growth  using  various  firm
characteristics,  such  as ownership  structure,  access  to  foreign markets,  access  to  credit,
investment behavior and  technology.  To do so, we first  examine bivariate  associations
between  various  firm characteristics  and  employment  dynamics.  Next,  we  carry  out
multivariate regression analysis to identify independent impact of selected variables.
Table  11  presents  relationships  between  selected  firm  characteristics  and  two
measures of job creation:  the absolute  and the relative change in employment.  The first
measure  shows  the average number  of jobs created  by a  given category of firms.  The
second measure relates this number to the initial average employment  in this category of
firms.
27We  examine  three  groups  of  factors  related  to job  creation.  The  first  group
consists of factors that may be associated with job creation but by itself do not influence
it.  An example is firm size.  Small firm size does not by and of itself cause employment
growth, but we found a pattern that small firms tend to create on average  more jobs than
large firms.
The  second  group consists  of factors,  which  influence job  creation,  but  at the
same  time  are  themselves  influenced  by  changes  in  employment.  Examples  include
profitability,  productivity  or  labor  cost,  which  are  likely  to  have  an  impact  on
employment,  but  simultaneously  they  vary  with  changes  in  employment.  There  is
"reverse causality" and such factors are called endogenous.
The third group comprises of true determinants ofjob creation, that is factors that
influence  employment but are independent of it.  Examples include access to credit, FDI
or export orientation.  Firms, which have access to credit, to foreign  capital or to foreign
markets,  may find it easier to expand and  thus increase  employment.  These factors  are
referred to as exogenous.
As Table  11  documents,  small firms tend to create jobs while large firms destroy
them.  Micro firms, which are preponderant  in Lithuania,  created on average  1.6 jobs per
firm, that is increased  their employment by  as much as one-third  during  1999-2000.  In
contrast,  large firms on average  closed over 30 jobs per firm,  thus reducing  employment
by close to 9 percent.  This pattern points to the restructuring process going on in larger
firms, which need to shed labor in order to reduce cost and stay competitive.  At the same
time, this finding points to the critical role played by business climate for job creation, as
it is small  firms which suffer the most from unfavorable business environment.
28Table 11  Changes in Employment by Firm Category, 1999-2000
Average  Average  change  Employment
Firm characteristics  )Epomn
(1999)  Number of  firms  )  employment  in employment  w  rate (%)
(1999)  (persons)
All firms  12963  -1.4  -3.6
Size (employment)
Micro (1-10)  6902  4.8  1.6  32.6
Small (I1-50)  4223  22.9  0.5  2.2
Medium (51-100)  929  70.6  -3.6  -5.1
Large (101+)  909  355.5  -31.2  -8.8
Foreign ownership
None a)  11693  35.5  -1.1  -3.1
Minority  453  96.5  -8.0  -8.3
Majority  793  75.9  -2.8  -3.6
Export orientation
Exporting firms  1273  165.3.0  -4.6  -2.8
Non-exporting finns  880  30.8  0.4  1.2
No data  10810  30.9  -1.4  -4.5
Access  to credit
Yes  2125  113.7  -9.5  -8.4
No  10838  25.6  0.1  0.5
Fixed capitalformation (investment)
Negative or zero  5260  38.9  -4.1  -10.5
10  1116  108.3  -6.1  -5.7
25  932  79.1  -3.8  -4.8
50  816  48.7  1.4  2.9
Morethan50%  1851  31.7  1.4  4.4
No data  2988  7.1  3.1  44.4
Capital intensity
Very low (1st quintile)  2527  16.0  0.8  4.9
Low (2nd quintile)  2526  25.0  -0.3  -1.4
Medium (3rd quintile)  2526  39.3  -1.6  -4.1
High (4th quintile)  2526  47.1  -2.3  -4.9
Very high (5th quintile)  2526  77.3  -4.3  -5.6
29Firm characteristics  Average  Average  change  Employment
(1999)  Number of finns a)  employment  in employment  g  rate (%)
(1999)  (persons)
Productivity
Very low (Ist quintile)  2593  31.0  -1.1  -3.5
Low (2nd quintile)  2593  45.2  -2.6  -5.9
Medium (3rd quintile)  2592  45.0  -1.8  -4.0
High (4th quintile)  2593  47.0  -2.5  -5.3
Veiy high (5th quintile)  2592  32.1  0.8  2.5
Unit labor  costs
Very low (1st quintile)  2591  24.6  0.9  3.6
Low (2nd quintile)  2591  38.3  -1.4  -3.5
Medium (3rd quintile)  2591  52.0  -2.7  -5.2
High (4th quintile)  2591  55.2  -3.5  -6.4
Very high (5th quintile)  2590  29.9  -0.5  -1.8
Profitability  (%)
Negative or zero  5836  40.1  -3.4  -8.5
10  4882  43.1  -0.5  -1.1
25  1594  35.0  2.3  6.5
More than 25%  651  29.1  -0.1  -0.4
a)  Active in both 1999 and 2000.
Definitions of variables:  Access to credit = liabilities to credit institutions.
Fixed capital formation = %  increase in the value of fixed tangible assets over one year.
Capital intensity (capital-to-labor  ratio) = value of fixed tangible assets over employment.
Productivity = sales over employment
Unit labor costs = wages and social security contnbutions over sales.
Profitability = operating profit over sales
Note: the "no data" category  is shown  only if includes  a large number of firms.
Source.  Survey of enterprises  main  financial indicators  (F  OI)for 1999 and 2000, Lithuanian  Department of  Statistics;
Bank staffcalculatwns.
Foreign direct investment has no clear direct impact on job creation.  If anything,
the impact is negative,  as firms with foreign capital tend to cut on average more jobs than
domestic  firms.  However,  firms with a majority foreign stake perform  markedly better
than  firms  with  the  minority  stake.  The  former  reduced  employment  by  less  than
4 percent  while  the  latter  by  over  8 percent.  Still,  why  is  FDI  associated  with
employment decline instead of employment growth?  The likely reason is that firms with
foreign  capital  are  engaged  in intensive  restructuring  to  improve their  competitiveness.
30This does not imply that FDI contributes  to job destruction.  In the absence  of FDI the
long-term  employment  record  of the  firms  might  have been  still worse.  Furthermore,
FDI is likely to have a substantial positive indirect  impact on employment through access
to  foreign  markets  (e.g.,  distribution  networks)  and  investment  in  fixed  capital.
Attracting FDI still seems the best strategy to increase long-term employment.
Exporting  firms  reduced  employment  while  non-exporting  firms  slightly
increased it.  This may appear surprising,  as export means access to a bigger market and
thus  helps  to  overcome  the  often-quoted  domestic  demand  "constraint"  (see:  Doing
business in Lithuania).  Probably the same argument applies  here as in the  case of FDI.
Exporting  firms, which tend to be  large,  are shedding labor in order to lower their cost
and increase productivity and thus stay competitive.  Lack of restructuring  would likely
undermine their viability in the long run with even larger employment losses.
Access to credit is often a prerequisite to finns'  growth and thus one would have
expected that firms, which took credit, grew faster than those, which did not.  The reality
in Lithuania  has  proved just  the  opposite.  Firms-predominantly  large  ones-which
borrowed capital contracted  at a fast rate (over 8 percent), while firms which did not rely
on credit at least maintained  their employment level.  There are two possible reasons  for
this.  One  is  the  already  familiar  restructuring  argument:  that  credit  goes  to  overall
efficient but  restructuring  firms.  The  second  possibility  is  "soft"  lending,  i.e.,  credit
being  allocated  to  large,  inefficient  but well-connected  firms.  To  the  extent  that  the
former  is the case,  bank  lending supports  enterprise restructuring,  to the  extent that the
latter is the case, it inhibits it.  Soft lending implies inefficient allocation of resources,  an
in particular by limiting the amnount of credit available to well performing but small  firms
may be a major constraint  to  growth  (World Bank 2001c).  Additional  research,  going
beyond  the  scope  of  this  report,  is  necessary  to  determine  which  effect  has  been
predominant  in Lithuania.
Large  scale  investment  brings  about  employment  growth,  however  small  scale
investment tends to be coupled with employment reduction.  Firms, which increased their
fixed capital by more than 25 percent, experienced employment  gains, however limited in
magnitude-less than two persons.  Firms which carried out modest investment (less than
3125 percent)  experienced  employment losses, which in contrast were quite substantial.  For
example,  the  investment  rate  up  to  10  percent  was  associated  with  an  average
employment reduction by 6 persons, or almost 6 percent of initial firm employment.  It is
important to note that the investment  rate is inversely related to firm size:  smaller firms
tend to invest more relative to their initial capital than larger firms (disinvesting firms are
an exception to this pattern).
To interpret this findings one should bear in mind that whether or not investment
brings about an employment increase depends on its nature.  First,  investment can entail
mainly  a  switch  toward  a  more  capital-intensive  technology  with  a  relatively  small
increase in output.  In such a case  capital is substituted for labor with a resulting fall  in
employment.  Second,  investment can entail  both an increase in the capital-to-labor  ratio,
and an increase  in output large enough to bring about an increase in employment.  In the
second  case,  capital  and  labor  are  gross  complements  (despite  being  substitutes  in
production)  because  of  the  scale  effect  (i.e.,  the  increase  in  output  engendered  by
investment)  dominates  the  substitution  effect  (i.e.,  the  fall  in  employment  due  to  an
increased use of capital).  It seems that in Lithuania  small-scale investment  is associated
predominantly  with  the  substitution  effect  and  thus  gives  rise  to  a  reduction  in
employment.  In contrast,  large scale investment  leads to a scale effect which dominates
the substitution  effect and thus gives  rise to an increase in employment.  These findings
obviously do not imply that small-scale investment  is bad for employment.  The relevant
point  of reference  is  what  would  have  happened  to  employment  in  the  absence  of
investment.  Productivity  and  competitiveness  would  suffer  resulting  in  long-run
employment losses.
Capital-intensive  firms  tend  to  shed  labor  faster  than  labor-intensive  firms.
Capital  intensity  is,  however,  closely related  to  firm size:  in  small  firms  the capital-to
labor ratio is relatively low while in large firms it is relatively high.  For example,  firms
with low ratio of capital-to-labor  (bottom  quintile)  employed  on average  16 persons  in
1999  and  increased  their employment  by almost  5 percent over  one year.  In contrast,
firms with high capital to labor ratio (top quintile)  employed on average  77 persons,  and
decreased  their employment  by  close to  6 percent.  Apparently,  large  capital-intensive
32firms  are  less  dynamic  than  small  labor-intensive  firms  but  the  exact  reasons  for this
needs to be further investigated.
High  labor productivity  is good  for job creation  although  the relationship  is not
straightforward.  The job creation record of firms with the highest labor productivity (top
quintile)  is  markedly  better  than  that  of  firms  with  the  lowest  productivity  (bottom
quintile).  Interestingly,  firms  in the both  extreme  groups  are  comparable  in  size  (they
tend to be small), so this factor does not distort the comparison.  Highly productive firms
increased  their  employment  by  2.5  percent  in  2000,  while  low  productivity  firms
decreased  their  employment  by  3.6  percent.  Firms  in  the  middle  of the productivity
distribution (which  tend to be  larger than both the  most and the least productive  firms)
had  the  worst  employment  record,  however,  reducing  employment  by 4  to  6 percent.
One possible  reason  is that  it is  the moderately  productive  firms,  which  are  under the
biggest  competitive pressure  to improve productivity and  thus shed labor.  For obvious
reasons  highly  productive  firms  have  less  reasons  to  restructure,  while  the  least
productive  firms  can  be  those  whose  function  in  the  protected  and  not  exposed  to
competition segment of the market.  This is an issue that needs further examination.
Low unit labor costs  reflect high labor productivity.  Not surprisingly  then, the
relationship  between  labor costs and job creation is an mirror image of that between job
creation  and productivity.  Firms  with low  labor cost (bottom quintile)  have by  far the
best job  creation record.  They  created  on average  almost  one job per firm,  increasing
their employment by 3.6 percent.  Firms with higher labor costs tend to eliminate  rather
than create jobs, although the relationship is not monotonic:  firms with the highest labor
costs perform  somewhat better in terms of employment than firms in the middle of the
distribution.  Again,  this  likely  reflects  the  fact  that  firms  with  high  unit  labor  cost
operate in the segment of the economy that is protected from intense competition.
Profitable firms have  a better job creation  record than  unprofitable  ones.  Loss-
making  firms  decreased  their  employment  by  over  8  percent,  laying  of  on  average
3.4 persons  per firm.  In  a way  this is  a welcome  development,  indicating  that  poorly
performing firms engage in restructuring  to improve their performance.  Firms operating
with a narrow profit margin (less than  10 percent)  also tend to restructure,  although on a
33much smaller  scale:  they reduced their employment by about  1 percent,  on average less
than one  person  per firm.  The  main  creators  of jobs are  firms,  which  generate  solid
profits  (11 to 25 percent profit rate).  On average they generated over 2 jobs per firm, and
increased  their  employment  by  6.5  percent.  Quite  surprisingly,  however,  the  most
profitable finns (with the profit rate above 25 percent) if anything, slightly decrease their
employment.  One  possible  reason  is  that their  high  profitability  has  been  achieved
through  substantial  productivity  gains,  which (given  the output  level),  were  likely  to
result in employment reductions.
The shortcoming of the above analysis is that some variables  are correlated  with
others and thus their relation with the dependent variable also reflects the impact of  these
other variables.  A regression analysis was applied to circumvent this shortcoming and to
determine  the independent  effect of various factors affecting job creation.  To reduce the
endogeneity problem, the endogenous variables were lagged by one year.
The main results from the regression analysis are as follows (Table  12).
34Table 12  Regressions of Employment on Selected Firm Characteristics
Regression models
Explanatory  variables
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
empl99  0.9022***  0.8946***  0.8895***  0.8939***
9763  90.63  90.12  83 62
foreign  0.0007*  0.0007  0.0003  0.0003
1.7  1.54  0.58  0 54
export  0.0011**  0.0009**  0.0008**  0.0010***
3.53  2.32  2.23  2 51
credit  0.0399  0.0423  0.0149  0.0166
1.51  1.58  0 55  0 57
capform  0.0233**  0.0230***  0.0220***  0.0193***
3 62  3.55  3.42  2 62
ktol  0.0319**  0.0320***







industry  no  yes  yes  yes
constant  0.3215  0.2780  -0.3689  -0.7550
No. of  obs.  885  885  885  650
Adj. R 2 0.939  0.941  0.942  0.947
Dependent variable: log of average employment in 2000
Definitions of explanatory variables:  empI99 = log of average employment in 1999
foreign  = share of foreign  ownership, %
export = share of exports in total sales, %
credit = I if  a firm has a debt towards financial institutions, 0 otherwise
capform = log of mcrease in fixed tangible assets over a year, %
ktol = log of capital-to-labor ratio
Iwage= log of average wage
productiv=log productivity (sales per employee).
profitab = log of the ratio of operating profit to sales
35mdustry = 2-digit NACE classification
All explanatory variables refer to 1999
Absolute values of the t-statistics are in italics
***  - significant at the I percent level, **  -significant  at the 5  percent level, * - significant
at the 10 percent level (for two-sided t test).
Firm  size  has  a  significant  independent  impact  on  fium  growth  prospects:
employment in small firms grows faster than in large finms.  As result, initial differences
in  firm  size  after  one year  are  reduced  by about  10  percentage  points.  For  example,
imagine two firms,  one employing 25 workers and the other 50 workers.  Assume that the
larger  firm increases employment by 2 percent over one year.  Then our model implies
that the smaller firm will increase  employment by 7.4 percent.  Both firms will converge
in size, although very gradually:  in absolute terms the size differential will be reduced by
only one  person.  So, the magnitude  of the net impact of firm size  on its  employment
growth should not be overemphasized.
Foreign  direct  investment  hardly influences  firm  employment,  at least  directly.
All  else  held  constant,  an  increase  in  the  share of foreign  capital  does  not  have  any
significant effect-either positive or negative-on the firm's employment growth.
Exporting  finns tend  to  create  more jobs  and  thus  employ  more workers  than
similar non-exporting  firms, however the differential  is small.  Other things being equal,
a  10  percent  higher  export  share  on  average  results  in only  about  1 percent  higher
employment (after one year,  assuming the same initial employment level).  This result is
in contrast to the negative one obtained earlier using descriptive  statistics.  According to
the regression  analysis,  the net impact of export on employment growth  is positive and
thereby consistent with economic theory.
Ceteris paribus, finns, which have access to credit, do not generate more jobs than
firm,  which  do not.  Although  the  effect  is  positive,  it  is  not  statistically  significant.
Thus, as indicated earlier,  credit does not seem to go to firms with a growth potential and
thus does not help to generate employment."
1  Accordmng  to  a  survey  of SMEs,  small  firms  report  the  shortage  of working  capital  as  bemg  one of the  mamn
problems for their development,  and claim that external financing  is difficult to obtain.  Thus, poor access to credit by
small firms is likely to limit their job creation potential.
36Investment  in  fixed  capital  leads  to faster  employment  growth.  All  else being
equal,  a 10  percent higher investment  in fixed capital  engenders  additional  employment
increase of around  0.2 percent,  which is statistically highly significant.  Thus, contrary to
some fears, investment has a pro-employment impact.
By the same vein,  an increase  in capital  intensity  is beneficial  for employment.
Controlling  for the impact of other variables,  a  10 percent increase in the capital-to-labor
ratio contributes around 0.4 of a percentage point to the firm's rate of annual employment
growth.  Again,  in this  case the  regression  analysis  indicates  a positive  net  impact,  in
contrast to a negative gross impact suggested by the descriptive  analysis.
Productivity differentials  between firms translate into  differences  in employment
growth.  Higher productivity firms tend to grow faster.  A ten percent higher productivity
implies  some 0.4 percentage  point faster annual  employment  growth.  This contradicts
the  popular  view  that  productivity  improvements  imply  employment  loses.  To  the
contrary,  productivity gains are beneficial for job creation.
Other variables held constant, higher wages  contribute to job creation.  This may
seem surprising at first, as it is natural  to assume that higher wages imply lower demand.
However,  given that we control  for profitability,  the result means that higher wages may
be associated  with faster  employment  growth provided  that profits  are unaffected.  In
other  words,  if higher  wages  are  associated  with  higher  productivity,  offsetting  the
negative  impact  of higher wages  on unit labor  cost,  then they do not hurt job creation.
This is consistent with the efficiency  wages theory (which asserts that higher wages can
spur productivity improvements)  and with our earlier finding that more productive firms
grow faster.
Profitability,  contrary  to  common  perception,  does  not contribute  to faster job
creation.  Its net impact on employment is negligible and statistically insignificant.
The results of the regression  analysis  in  a few  cases  differ radically  from those
obtained  earlier  and  based  on  descriptive  statistics.  Specifically,  regression  analysis
points  to  a positive  independent  employment  impact of exports  and  capital  intensity,
contrary  to  the  descriptive  results.  Also,  the  regression  analysis  indicates  that
37productivity  has  a positive  effect  on  employment,  while  according  to the  descriptive
results the effect was non-linear.  Thus,  also in this case the regression  analysis sends  a
stronger and more positive message than the simple descriptive  analysis.  Obviously, the
results  of the  regression  analysis  are  more  informative  and  are  more  likely to  reveal
causal relationships as they provide a net rather than gross effect of a variable.
Let us briefly summarize the main findings:
*  All else being  equal,  small  firms  have a bigger  employment  creation potential
than larger firms;
*  The  share  of foreign  capital  has  no  visible  direct  impact on  firm  employment
performance;
*  Export orientation  has a significant positive  impact on firm employment  growth,
although  the magnitude of the effect tends to be small.  One possible reason for
the small  magnitude  of the  effect  is that there  are  two opposite forces  at work.
Once is access to foreign markets with positive effect on employment.  The other
is  a  greater  focus  on  productivity  with  a  negative  short-term  effect  on
employment;
*  Access  to credit is not associated  with better employment performance.  This may
suggest  that credit  does not go to expanding  firms (which tend to be small), but
instead is directed  to stagnant or contracting  firms  (which tend to be large).  To
the extent this is the case,  inefficient  allocation  of financial  resources  limits the
job creation potential of SMEs;
*  Investment  brings  about  employment  growth:  capital  and  labor  turn  out to  be
gross  complements  in Lithuania,  despite being  substitutes  in production.  Other
things being equal, more capital  intensive  firms have a better job creation  record
than less capital intensive firms;  and
*  Labor productivity  contributes  to employment  growth in Lithuania,  invalidating
fears that productivity improvements  imply job cuts.
38Job Turnover and Unemployment
What  is  the  link  between  job  turnover  and  unemployment?  Can  high
unemployment  in  Lithuania  be  attributed  to  intensive  enterprise  restructuring  and
associated  high  rate  of job  reallocation?  Theoretical  analysis  shows  that  there  is  an
equilibrium relation between the job reallocations rate, the rate of unemployment  and the
mean  duration  of unemployment,  however  the  relation  depends  also  on  other  factors
(Garibaldi  et  al.,  1996).  In  general,  accelerated  job  reallocation  can  increase
unemployment,  especially  if there is inertia to labor mobility, but at the same time it is
likely to  result in shorter  unemployment  spells.  These  relationships  are supported  by
empirical  evidence.  In  OECD  countries  low job  reallocation  is  associated  with more
long-term unemployment  (Garibaldi  et  al.,  1996).  Recent study for Poland  showed that
an  accelerated  pace  of job  reallocation,  which  occurred  in  the  late  1990s,  was
accompanied by a marked increase  in unemployment  (World Bank,  2001).
High  unemployment  in  Lithuania  can thus  be  attributed  to,  at  least  partly,  the
persistently high rate of job reallocation,  which  is coupled with limitations  on mobility
from old jobs to new jobs.  However,  the high rate of job turnover in Lithuania coexists
with  long  average  duration  of unemployment,  which  is  not consistent  with theoretical
predictions.  In theory, high job turnover should improve the chances of the unemployed
to find a new job, but in fact it does not.
It is relatively easy to explain why high job reallocation  in Lithuania  is associated
with high unemployment.  There are two possible reasons.  First, in the short-run high job
reallocation  can contribute to unemployment owing to productivity gains.  Second, given
heterogeneity  of jobs and workers,  high job reallocation may contribute to frictional and
structural unemployment.
Productivity improvements.  Job  reallocation  brings  about  productivity  gains
because supposedly it entails the destruction  of low-productivity jobs and the creation of
high-productivity jobs.  Higher productivity means that the same output can be produced
with fewer workers.  The negative effect of productivity increase on unemployment is of
a short-term  character,  since  in  the  longer term  the  increase  in productivity  results  in
lower unit labor cost  and leads to new investments which bring about new jobs and thus
39mitigate unemployment.'2 Another way of looking  at the link between productivity and
unemployment  is to note that there is no secular trend of the increase  in unemployment,
which would have existed if rising productivity were causing joblessness.
Frictional and structural unemployment.  Job  reallocation  means  that  the
displaced  workers need to search for new jobs, which takes time and requires acquiring
information on new job opportunities.  Moreover, jobs that have been destroyed usually
differ in salient characteristics  (e.g.,  skills required to perform  them, or location)  from
those,  which  have been  created.  Workers  need to  acquire  new  skills  or/and move  to
different  locations  to  find  new jobs.  Given  that  workers  are  not  perfectly  mobile,
structural  (skill  and spatial)  mismatches  arise.  That is, job reallocation gives rise to the
mismatch  between  the  skills  demanded  and  supplied  in  a  given  area,  or  causes  an
imbalance between the supplies of and demands for workers across areas.  Frictional  and
structural  unemployment  are  thus  an  unavoidable  consequence  of  restructuring  and
associated reallocation of labor (Lilien,  1982, Abraham and Katz,  1986)."
It is more difficult to explain the coexistence  of high job turnover and long-term
unemployment in Lithuania.  One possible hypothesis is that the long average duration of
unemployment is due to the particular structure of  job turnover in Lithuania, i.e., the fact
that job destruction has been higher than job creation.  In other words, high job turnover
in Lithuania has taken place in the context of the overall  fall in the number of available
jobs  and  associated  employment  decline.  In  addition  (and  not  independently)  the
diminishing job availability  has been likely to lead to the disenfranchisement  of many
long-term  unemployed,  whose  employability  has  dramatically  diminished  due  to  the
erosion of their skills and morale.  Accordingly,  the long-term unemployed  in Lithuania
are hardly able to benefit from high job turnover.  Finally, it is also possible that there are
wage rigidities,  which negatively affect job-finding probabilities among certain groups of
workers, which is an issue that will be explored later.
12  This is under the assumption that productivity  gains are not fully consumed in the form of  higher wages but instead
improve the rate of  return on investments.
13 It should be noted that in  a frictionless  world the increase m job destruction-if matched by a proportionate  increase
in job creation-would  not lead  to the mcrease  in unemployment.  It is  commonly  assumed that the hiring fimction
H=f(V,  U) is  Inearly  homogenous  in the number  of vacancies,  V,  and unemployment,  U, and  this  assumption is not
refuted by  the  evidence (Layard  et  al.,  1991).  This  means  that if, say, the  numbers  of unemployed  and vacancies
double,  then the number of  hires will double too,  leaving the unemployment rate unchanged.
40To  sum  up,  the  high  job  reallocation  rate  prevailing  in  Lithuania  has  likely
contributed  to high  unemployment  in two  ways.  First,  high job reallocation  has most
probably  created  skill  and  regional  mismatches  which  have  given  rise  to  structural
unemployment.  Second,  high  job  reallocation  has  likely  brought  about  productivity
improvements,  which  in  the  short-run  might have  resulted  in some  net job  loses  and
associated increase in unemployment.  However,  high job turnover has taken place in the
context of high job destruction, which has exceeded job creation,  and thus the fall in the
overall employment level.  The diminished job availability has contributed to the build up
of long-term  unemployment.  As long-term  unemployment  is often  associated with the
loss  of  skills,  many  of  the  long-term  unemployed  have  become  marginalized  and
probably are not able to benefit from the relatively high hiring rate.
What  are  the  policy  implications  of  the  above  results?  First,  to  the  extent
unemployment in Lithuania results form productivity improvements, this should not be of
policy  concem,  as  in the  longer-run  higher productivity  is  going  to  be beneficial  for
employment  (given that the wage growth will not outpace that of productivity).
Second,  to the extent that unemployment  is structural, policy measures to reduce
skill  and  regional  mismatches  can produce  beneficial  effects.  Such  measures  include
training and retraining, as well as improving the housing market or promoting commuting
through  lowering  transportation  costs  (which  includes  better  transport  infrastructure,
e.g., roads).
Third,  long-term  unemployment  can be partially  tackled  by carefully  targeting
active labor  market interventions  (such  as  training)  at persons  who are  at high risk  of
long-term unemployment.14
III.  WORKER PERSPECTIVE:  LONG JOB SEARCH DURATION
From the worker's perspective  a labor market is efficient if it is easy to find a job
paying  a decent  wage.  This involves high probability of avoiding  unemployment,  short
duration  of job search,  and  wages that  adequately  reflect  productivity differentials  and
14  This  usually  involves  changes  in  the incentive  structure  faced  by public  employment  services  so  that  they use
profiling instead of creaming (i.e.,  focusing on those unemployed who are easiest to place to jobs).
41human  capital  heterogeneity.  The  Lithuanian  labor  market  does not  fully  meet  these
conditions.  The risk of loosing a job is relatively high, however the chances of finding a
new one are rather low.  Unemployment  spells thus tend to be of long duration.  Poorly
educated,  low-skilled  and  inexperienced  workers  find  it  particularly  difficult  to  find
employment.  One  possible  reason  is  compression  of wages  at  the  lower  end  of the
distribution,  which is likely to inhibit employment  chances of less productive  workers.
Labor Flows
The risk of losing a job and the chance to find a new one are best depicted by the
so  called  transition  matrixes,  which  show  estimated  probabilities  that  workers  move
across different labor force states, such as employment  and unemployment.  Large labor
flows between employment  and unemployment  indicate  a dynamic  labor market,  where
there is a  lot of both firing and hiring.  Many  workers  loose their jobs but they find it
relatively  easy to find  a  new one, thus  their unemployment  spells tend to be short.  In
contrast,  limited  labor  flows point to a stagnant  market,  where few workers  loose their
jobs but those who become unemployed have little chances to find work.  Unemployment
is a stagnant pool, workers tend to stay jobless for a long time, with their chances to find
a job  gradually  declining,  often  up to the  point they become  detached  from the  labor
market and become virtually unemployable.
We will focus on the analysis of yearly labor flows (transitions)  as this allows us
to do some international  comparison.  However,  it should be noted, that yearly transition
data  can  be  inaccurate  due  to  the  problem  of "round-tripping",  that  is  uncaptured
movements between  different  labor force states that take place  within one  year.  Thus,
yearly  transition  data  underestimate  the  true  labor  flows  by  disregarding  the  labor
movements that took place during the year.
Lithuanian workers face  a high risk of loosing  a job.  As much as 5.7 percent of
workers  who  were  employed  in May 2000 were  unemployed  one year later  (Table  13,
Panel A).  This is a high job separation  rate by standards of both transition and  OECD
economies (Boeri 1998).  For example, the job separation rate in Poland in the mid to late
1990s varied between 2.2 and 3.4 percent (Bell 2001), that is roughly half the magnitude
observed  in  Lithuania.  Similarly,  in Slovakia-another  high unemployment  country-
42the job separation  rate was 2.3 percent in 1999 (World Bank 2001c), that is considerably
lower than in Lithuania.  It seems that only in Russia, and-to a smaller extent-Bulgaria
the inflows from employment into unemployment were of similarly large magnitude as in
Lithuania (5.6 percent in Russia 1995/96 and 4.3 percent in Bulgaria in  1996/96).'5
Table 13  Transition Probabilities Across Labor Force States
Panel A
May, 2001
May, 2000  Employed  Unemployed  Out of the labor force
Same job  New job
Employed  82.1  5.6  5.7  6.6
Unemployed  x  24.0  60.4  15.6
Out of the labor force  x  5.2  4.8  89.9
Panel B
May, 2001
November, 2000  Employed  Unemployed  Out of the labor force
Same job  New job
Employed  89.4  3.7  3.2  3.7
Unemployed  x  30.2  57.5  12.3
Out of the labor force  x  3.5  3.0  93.5
Source  Lithuanian  Labor  Force  Survey, Bank staff calculations.
Expectedly,  most of the jobs are terminated by employers, so job separations are
largely involuntary.  Lay-offs  are the main reason  for unemployment  among previously
employed worker (46 percent), followed by terminations of temporary jobs (22 percent).
Still,  voluntary  quits  account  for  a  sizeable  proportion-almost  one-third-of
unemployment  among  the  previously  employed  (Table  14).  This  indicates,  that  a
relatively  large group of workers  accepts temporary  spells of unemployment  as a means
of changing-presumably  improving-their labor market status.
5  Data for Russia are reported m Bell (2001), data for Bulgaria taken from World Bank (2001a).
43Table  14  Mobility Across  Labor Force States: Lithuania against Selected  Countries
Country  Period  Shorrock's index (* 100)
Bulgaria  1995-96  36.7
Lithuania  2000-01  31.0
Poland  1997-98  31.3
Russia  1995-96  38.5
Slovakia  1999Q1-Q4  17.6
USA  1992-93  61.6
Note: the Shorrock's index is defined as S=(n-tr(P))/(n-1)  and is proportional  to the fraction of persons who changed
their status within a given penod.
where: n denotes the number of states and tr(P) is the trace of  the transition matrix P.
S takes the value of 0 when nobody changed their status, and the value of n/n-I when everybody  changed their status,
Sources:  Bulgaria:  Garibaldi et al. (2001)
Lithuania. Labor Force Survey, May 2000 and May 2001
Poland: Bell (2001); Russia: Bell (2001); Slovakia.  World Bank (2001c)
USA: Boeri (1998), Bank staff calculations
The unemployment  problem in  Lithuania is magnified by large  numbers of new
entrants  to  the  labor  market.  The  yearly  transition  rate  from  inactivity  into
unemployment  accounts  for  4.8  percent,  and  is  substantially  higher  than  in  other
transition  economies.  For  example,  in  Poland  this  rate  was  2.2  percent  in  1997/78
(Bell 2001),  about half that observed in Lithuania.
A vast majority (86 percent)  of the  unemployed  in Lithuania has previous  labor
market experience.  This proportion is quite typical of transition economies  and indicates
that  the  labor  market  is  in  the state  of flux,  that  people  lose jobs  mainly  because  of
enterprise restructuring.  It is interesting to contrast this with situation prevailing in some
transition  economies  with  the  most  rigid  labor  markets.  For  example  in  Macedonia,
which  as  other  former  Yugoslav  republics  inherited  an  extremely  high  level  of
employment protection,  the proportion  is reversed:  a majority of the unemployed are new
entrants (mostly school  leavers)  whom low labor turnover  prevents  from finding  a job.
The above  figure  suggests that  (despite high youth  unemployment,  which  is a common
phenomenon) barriers to entry are not a dominant labor market  problem in Lithuania.  It
is  largely  enterprise  restructuring  and  associated  lay-offs  which  contribute  to
unemployment.
44How difficult is it for the unemployed in Lithuania to find a new job?  The picture
is not too optimistic.  Only a minority-one-fourth--of the unemployed  find a job within
a  year.  This  is  worse  than  in  Poland  or  Bulgaria  (where  around  one-third  of the
unemployed  find a job within a year), or in Russia (near 40 percent), but better than  in
Slovakia,  where the yearly job accession  rate is less than 20 percent.  These data should
be viewed against the benchmark of the high turnover labor market in the US, where the
majority (almost two-thirds) of the unemployed find a job within a year (Boeri 1998).
Surprisingly,  the  examination  of half-yearly  transitions  from  unemployment  to
jobs gives a more positive picture.  It turns out that the half-yearly job accession rate-at
30 percent-is  in Lithuania  higher than the  yearly  rate (Table  13,  Panel  B).  Thus,  the
chances  to find a job within six months  are not that bad.  However,  it is likely that these
new jobs are not long lasting but rather temporary, precarious jobs leading to a next spell
of unemployment.1 6
All in  all, labor flows are quite limited in Lithuania.  The percentage  of workers
who change  their labor force  status tends to be somewhat lower than in other transition
economies,  which  in  general  are  characterized  by  the  stagnant  unemployment  pool
(Table  15).  This  implies  that  from  the  worker  perspective,  the  labor  market  is  not
dynamic.
16 Another factors which may account for this apparent paradox  are seasonal effects (November is a lower employment
season than May) and sample bias (i.e.,  one of the two samples is not representative).
45Table 15  The Unemployed  by Employment History and Reasons for
Unemployment,  2001
Reasons for unemployment  Unemployed
All unemployed  100.0
New entrants  14.1
Job losers  85.9
All job losers  100.0
Lay off  45.7
Termination of temporary job  22.4
Voluntary quits and other reasons  31.9
Source: Labor Force  Survey, May 2001, Bank staff calculatons.
Finding new  employment  is  a lengthy process.  On average,  it takes  over three
years of job  search  before  a new job  is  found.'7 This  means  that  unemployment  in
Lithuania  is  of a  long-term  nature,  and  it  is  thus  very  costly  for  both  the  affected
individuals  and  the  society  as a whole.  International  experience  shows that long-term
unemployment  often leads to disenfranchisement  and social exclusion, as chances  to find
a job  decrease  with  unemployment  duration.  This  so  called  "duration  dependence"
results from the erosion of skills and motivation on the part of the long-term unemployed
as well as from the employers'  reluctance  to hire workers who were jobless for a long
time, whom they consider as less productive.
Some worker groups are more successful  than others in finding new employment.
Two  groups  stand  out  in  this  respect.  These  are  young  workers  and  workers  with
university  education,  (Table  16).  Both these groups  on average  find work much faster
than their older and less  educated  counterparts.  For example,  it takes younger workers
(aged  15-24) half the time needed to find ajob by older workers (aged 55-64).  Similarly,
university educated workers need about half the time necessary  to find a job by workers
with less than upper secondary education.  Put differently,  50 percent of younger workers
and university  educated  workers find a new job within less than  18 months,  while other
1  The average  estimated  duration  of an  uncompleted unemployment  spell  is  21.1  months.  In  a  steady  state,  the
average duration  of a completed unemployment spell is twice as long as that of an uncompleted spell.
46groups  need well  over 2 years  to achieve  the  same outcome  (50 percent  success  rate).
Unfortunately,  these relatively successful  worker groups  are a minority.  For a majority
of the jobless chances  of finding a job quickly  are very slim.  This is yet more evidence
of a stagnant unemployment pool.
Table 16  Duration of Uncompleted Unemployment  Spells  (2001)
A.  Distribution of Unemployment  by Duration
Share in unemployment
Less than  1 month  10.1
1-6 months  25.4
7-12 months  16.0
13-24 months  16.3
25 months or more  32.3
B.  Average Duration
Mean duration  Median duration
months
All unemployed  21.1  12
Gender
Men  22.5  14
Women  19.1  12
Age
15-24  14.0  9
25-54  22.3  14
55-64  26.2  23
Education
University  14.6  8
College  20.7  12
Upper secondary  20.1  12
Lower secondary  25.3  14
Primary  25.3  19
Source  Lithuanian  Labor  Force  Survey,  May 2001,  Bank staff calculations.
47Do the unemployed become discouraged by the futility of their job search effort?
The  "discouraged  worker"  effect  is  considerable,  although  not  larger  than  in  other
countries.  Around  16 percent  of the unemployed  in Lithuania  become  inactive within
one year, that is they ceased their job search (or become unavailable  for work).  This is
less than in Bulgaria (28 percent),  similar as in Poland,  but much more than in Slovakia
(less than 5 percent).
Another  measure  of the discouraged worker  effect  is the proportion  of persons
who  are categorized  as economically  inactive,  but in fact  would  like to work  and are
available for work;  the reason they are not looking for work that they think that no jobs
are available.  This proportion, at 2 to 4.5 percent, is non negligible in Lithuania.  18  If the
discouraged workers were counted as unemployed,  rather than out of the labor force, then
the  number of unemployed  in  Lithuania  would  be higher by some  10 to  20 percent.
These figures are complementary  to the unemployment rate measure of the labor market
slack and illustrate perceived difficulties in finding a job.
The unemployed have to compete for jobs with new entrants to the labor market
(e.g., school leavers)  and also with those who already have jobs but may be perceived by
employers  as  better  matches  for  existing  vacancies.  It  turns  out  that  indeed  such
competition takes place in  Lithuania,  and that  in many cases  the unemployed  loose the
game,  i.e.,  are  at disadvantage  when  competing  with  workers  without  unemployment
history.  First, job-to-job  transitions  are  quite  significant  in Lithuania;  5.6  percent  of
workers change a job within a year.  This is somewhat more than, for example, in Poland
where  the job-to-job  transitions  account  for between  4 and  5 percent  of employment
(Bell 2001).  Second,  flows form inactivity to jobs are relatively large in Lithuania,  again
larger than in Poland (5.2 percent against 4.3 percent,  respectively).
As a result,  the unemployed  are a minority among the new hires (Table 17).  The
bulk of the vacancies is taken by persons who changed jobs (46 percent) and new entrants
(8 percent).  Only the remaining  46 percent of vacancies  goes to the unemployed.  This
18  The figures differ depending on the adopted definition of the discouraged worker.  According  to a broad definition,
the discouraged  worker  is not  looking for  a job but  would like to work  and  is available  for  work.  According  to a
narrow definition,  the discouraged worker explicitly gives the lack of available jobs as an reason for not looking for a
job (in addibon, as in the previous definition, they would like to work and are available for work).
48partly explains relatively  low probability of escaping  unemployment.  It also points  to a
possible problem of the skill gap or skill mismatch on the part of the unemployed.  Some
of them may have troubles finding a job because their skills fall short of those required by
employers.
Table 17  New Hires by Previous Labor Market Status, 2001
Labor force status one year earlier
Employed  45.9
Unemployed  45.7
Out of the labor force  8.4
Sample size  136.0
New hires:  persons who hold their present job for 12 months or less.
Source  Lithuanian  Labor Force Survey, May 2001, Bank staffcalculations
The Skills  Gap
Indeed, the  skills gap on the part of the unemployed seems to partly account  for
the limited transitions  from  unemployment into jobs.  On average, the unemployed,  and
especially the long-term unemployed,  have lower educational  attainment and lower skills
than the  employed  (Table  18).  In other  words,  there  is  an "excess  supply"  of poorly
educated persons  among the unemployed in  the sense that, all  else being equal,  there is
not enough low skilled jobs to eliminate unemployment.19 Consequently,  unemployment
is  disproportionately  concentrated  among  workers  with low  educational  attainment  and
poor  skills.  For example,  the unemployment  rate  among workers  with  less than upper
secondary  education is around  25 percent compared with 6 percent  among workers with
university  education.  Similarly,  the unemployment  rate  among  workers  in elementary
occupations  (i.e.,  the  low  skilled)  is  over  20 percent,  compared  with 4 percent  among
19 A critical  variable that here is assumed to be constant is the structure of wages.  A flexible wage  structure, entailing
the fall in relative wages of low skilled workers,  would help to absorb unemployment among poorly educated workers.
However,  social norms embedded inter alia in the minimum wage, prevent wages from adjustng to supply and demand
conditions.
49professionals  or  8  percent  among  technicians.  Low or inadequate  skills  are  thus  an
important factor behind high unemployment  in Lithuania. 20
Table 18  Unemployment  by Educational Attainment and Occupation, 2000
Unemployment  Share in  Share in
rate  unemployment  employment
Total  15.4  100.0  100.0
Education
University  5.9  7.2  20.9
College  13.6  21.7  25.0
Upper secondary general  17.3  23.1  20.0
Upper secondary vocational  18.6  22.2  17.7
Lower secondary general  26.2  14.9  7.6
Lower secondary vocational  24.0  8.7  5.0
Primaiy or less  9.3  2.1  3.8
Occupation
Managers  8.2  4.0  8.2
Professionals  3.6  3.0  14.3
Technicians  8.4  3.9  7.7
Office clerks  16.2  5.1  4.8
Service and sales workers  15.2  12.3  12.5
Agricultural workers  2.0  1.8  16.1
Craft workers  17.9  19.9  16.6
Machine operators and assemblers  20.2  13.3  9.5
Elementary occupations  21.8  15.7  10.2
Armed forces  4.2  0.0  0.2
Unknown  x  6.2  0.0
Not previously employed  x  14.9  x
Source: Laborforce, employment and  unemployment (survey data), 1997-2000, Statistics  Lithuania, Vilnius 2001;
Bank staffcalculations.
In order to  assess  the magnitude  of the skills  gap, let's carry out the following
thought  experiment.  Imagine  that that the number of available jobs grows to the point
where there is enough jobs for all the unemployed.  Assume that jobs for each education
20  In prnciple, a  flexible wage  structure  would make it possible to absorb  the excess  supply of low productivity
worker.  We examine wage flexibility  and institutional constraints thereto in the proceeding sections.
50level  grow at the  same  rate,  thus  maintaining the  existing  structure of employment by
education.  Assume  also  that skill  mismatch  occurs  only between  educational  levels.
i.e.,  there  are  no  skill  mismatches  within  educational  levels.22 Under  such  best-case
scenario,  where  the  number  of  vacancies  equals  the  number  of job  seekers,  about
22 percent of  all unemployed  will not find  a job because of skill  gap,  that is, because
their skills fall short of employers requirements.23 Expectedly, the extent of the skill gap
is  more  pronounced  among  the  long-term  unemployed  than  among  the  short-term
unemployed,  although  the difference  is relatively  small,  smaller  than in  other countries.
Given  the  current  rate  of unemployment  of about  17  percent,  the  estimated  skill  gap
implies  some 4 percent  unemployment  rate caused by skill gap.  This  is a lower bound
estimate  due  to  optimistic  assumptions  underlying  the  calculations.  In  reality,  the
problem of skill gap is likely to be even more pronounced.
The  problem  of  the  skill  gap-the  inadequacy  between  skills  demanded  by
employers  and  those possessed by the unemployed-seems  to be  more pronounced  in
Lithuania  than in some other transition economies  of Central  Europe.  For example,  in
both Bulgaria and Poland the skill gap is smaller, accounting  for about  17 and 14 percent
of unemployment,  respectively.24 Thus,  the inadequate  skill  level  of the  unemployed,
especially of the long-term  unemployed,  are  likely to be a key factor behind  relatively
limited  outflows  from  unemployment  to  work  in  Lithuania.  Poor  skills  prevent  a
substantial  fraction  of the unemployed  to  effectively  compete  for jobs,  and can lead  to
their marginalization  on the labor market.
The  apparent  importance  of the  skill  mismatch  problem  in  Lithuania  has  two
policy implications.  First, it indicates the need for greater  wage flexibility,  especially  at
the lower end of the wage  distribution,  in order to encourage the creation of low skilled
jobs  and improve  the  employment prospects  of poorly  educated  unemployed.  Second,
21 This is an optimistic scenario, since in reality due to the skill biased technological  change high skilled jobs grow at a
faster pace than low skilled jobs.
22 This is again an optimistic assumption  as after all skill mismatches do exit within educational  groups.
L
23  The formula to calculate the skill gap is: sg =  (u - et)  for u, > e, where ui and e 1 are percentage  shares of the
i-th educational  level in unemployment and employment, respectively,  and L is the number of educational  levels.
24  See Rutkowski  (1998) and Rutkowski (1999) for the estimates of the skill gap for Poland and Bulgaria, respectively.
51and more  fundamentally,  it points to the role of the educational  and training systems in
curbing the problem of low, narrow and inadequate skills.
Job Security
What kind of  jobs can Lithuanian workers bargain for? Are the jobs mainly stable
and well  paying  or  largely  precarious  and  low-paid?  One  popular  indicator  of job
stability-and thus labor market dynamics-is job tenure (OECD  1997).  If workers tend
to hold jobs for a long time this implies  that  the jobs  are secure and  labor  turnover  is
limited.  However, this usually comes at the cost of less hiring, which means less chances
to find work for those who are jobless.  In contrast,  short average job tenure points to a
flexible labor market, where jobs are less secure but at the same time there is more hiring
and  therefore  it is  easier  to find  a new job.  Accordingly,  a dynamic  labor market  is
characterized  by  relatively  short  average  employer  tenure  and  a  high  proportion  of
short-tenure workers (new hires).  Conversely,  long average tenure  and low proportion
of short-term workers indicate labor market stagnation.
One  would  have  expected  that  economic  transition  almost  by  defmition  is
associated  with widespread  movements  of labor  across  firms  and  industries,  and  thus
with an increased job instability  and thereby average  employer tenure is  shorter than in
mature  market  economies.  However,  given  that  transition  is  also  associated  with
widespread shedding of labor and depressed labor demand, the proportion of short-tenure
workers-new hires-may be  lower than  in  the dynamic  market economies.  Does the
Lithuanian labor market conform to this pattern?
The  data seem  to  confirm  the priors.  On average,  workers  in  Lithuania  have
shorter job tenure  than their counterparts  in mature market economies  (Table  19).  The
median job tenure in Lithuania  is 5 years, which is considerably less than almost 11  years
in Germany or 7.7 years  in France.  It is also less than the median job tenure in Poland,
(6.2  years), which is  a relatively  dynamic  transition  economy.  On the other  hand,  in
mature market  economies  with flexible  labor  markets  average job tenure  is similar  or
even shorter than in Lithuania.  For example, in the US-where the labor market is least
regulated among the OCED countries-the median job tenure is 4.2 years, that is almost
by one year shorter than in Lithuania  Also in Spain, which has aimed at making its labor
52market  more  flexible  by  encouraging  the  use  of fixed-term  contracts,  the median job
tenure (although not the mean) is shorter than in Lithuania.2 5
Table 19  Distribution of Employment  a) by Job Tenure: Lithuania against Selected
Countries
I and  2 and  5 and  10 and  Average  Median
Under 1  20 years
under 2  under5  underIO  under20  tenure  tenure
year  or over
years  years  years  years  (years)  (years)
Lithuania (2001)  15.4  8.9  21.6  25.4  16.8  11.9  8.3  5.0
Sector
Private sector  22.2  11.6  25.3  21.9  11.0  8.0  6.1  3.2
Public sector  6.1  5.3  16.6  30.1  24.8  17.1  10.7  8.0
Firmn size
-10  30.3  12.3  27.3  17.5  8.2  4.4  4.6  3.0
11  - 19  20.2  12.3  25.3  25.6  11.4  5.3  5.5  4.0
20-49  12.9  9.0  24.6  27.3  14.9  11.3  8.0  5.0
50+  9.9  7.1  17.6  27.5  21.9  16.1  9.8  7.0
Czech R.  19.2  36.6  12.0  14.8  17.4  9.0  2.0
Denmark  25.1  11.4  16.2  18.2  17.7  11.4  7.9  4.4
France  15.0  8.0  17.7  17.4  23.3  18.7  10.7  7.7
Germany  16.1  9.4  22.0  17.2  18.4  17.0  9.7  10.7
Poland (1999)  14.5  11.7  19.0  17.7  20.3  16.7  9.6  6.2
Spain  35.5  4.9  11.1  14.4  17.7  16.5  8.9  4.6
United Kingdom  19.6  10.7  19.5  23.5  17.3  9.4  7.8  5 0
United States  26.0  8.5  20.0  19.8  16.8  9.0  7.4  4.2
a) Wage and salary workers
Note.  data refer to 1995, unless stated otherwise.
Source:  Lithuania  -LFSMay 2001, Bankstaffcalculations
Poland  -LFS February  1999, Bank staff  calculations
OECD countnes -OECD  Employment Outlook 1997
As expected,  Lithuania  fares worse on another measure  of labor market dynamics,
which  is the percentage  of workers  in new jobs.  There  are less new hires  in Lithuania
than in most of the OECD countries.  For example,  15 percent the proportion of new hires
in Lithuania some 20 points lower than in  Spain and  10 points lower than in Denmark.
25  High mean  and  low  median  tenure  in  Spain reflect  the dual  character  of  its  labor market:  a  flexible  segment
consisting  of workers  on  fixed-term  contracts and  thereby  short employer  tenure,  and  a ngid segment,  consistmg  of
workers  with permanent  contracts and thus long employer tenure.
53(Table  17).  Compared with transition economies,  Lithuania has relatively less new hires
than the Czech Republic but somewhat more than Poland.
What all these figures tell us about the labor market  in Lithuania?  Consistent with
earlier  findings,  they point to "one-way"  labor  market  dynamics.  There  is substantial
"transition  dynamics",  which  has  manifested  itself  in  a  substantial  number  of job
separations,  and has shortened employer tenure of a large number of workers..  However,
there is still  little "development  dynamics"  which would manifest  itself in intense hiring
and job creation.  Lithuanian workers  have lost job security,  but have not yet gained the
hope for finding a new job.
The overall  picture presented  above conceals  significant variation in job stability
across  firms and sectors.  There  are distinct  differences  in the distribution  of job tenure
between  the  public  and  the  private  sector  as  well  as  depending  on  the  firm  size
(Table  17).  Not surprisingly, jobs in the public  sector are  much more stable  than  in the
private sector.  A mirror image of this is a much greater dynamics in the private sector.  A
median  worker  in  the private  sector  has  tenure  of 3.2  years,  while  his  public  sector
counterpart's  tenure  is  8 years.  At the same time,  22 percent of workers  in the private
sector work for less than year,  compared with only 6 percent in the public sector.
Expectedly,  small  finms  offer less  secure jobs than large  firms.  The  smaller  the
firm,  the  shorter job  tenure  and the higher the proportion  of new  hires.  To  illustrate,
median  tenure  in  firms  employing  up to  10  workers  is  3 years  and  the  proportion  of
workers  with less than one year tenure is 30 percent.  In comparison,  in firms employing
50  or more workers  median job tenure is  7 years-more  than twice  as long  as in small
firms-and the proportion  of new hires is  10 percent,  that is one-third  of that in  small
firms.  Thus, the worker looking for ajob has the biggest chance to find it in a small firm,
however his/her chances to keep it for a longer period will be limited.
Employer tenure  data prove that  small  private  firms  constitute  the most flexible
and  dynamic  segment  of  the  labor  market,  despite  facing  the  same  regulatory
environment as larger or public firms.  One likely reason that large, state owned firms are
characterized by less labor turnover is that they are strongholds of trade unions, which are
54in  position  to  enforce  existing  regulations  and  turn  them  to  the  advantage  of their
members.
What  is the size of the flexible segment of the Lithuanian  labor market?  If one
assumes  that "flexible firms" are those employing  up to 50 workers, then about one-half
of  the  Lithuanian  labor  market  is  flexible,  while  in  the  other  half  of  the  market
regulations  appear  more  binding  and  thus  restricting  labor  turnover.  The  flexible
segment  seems to be somewhat  smaller than  in Poland,  where  small  firms  account  for
65 percent of total employment.  A caveat is in place here,  however, that one cannot draw
far reaching  conclusions  based  on just one  indicator  of the  extent of flexibility.  Firm
level flexibility is affected by a number of factors, not just by firm size.  But if indeed the
size  of  the  flexible  segment  is  relatively  small  in  Lithuania,  then  labor  market
deregulation  can  be  a  way  of  enhancing  labor  market  flexibility  and job  creation,
although admittedly at the cost of less job stability.
Another  component  of  the  flexible  segment  of the  labor  market  are  so  called
"flexible jobs".  These  include fixed-term  and temporary jobs, part-time jobs,  and  self-
employment.  They have recently received much attention, since they have accounted  for
a large part of employment  growth that has occurred in the EU.  How does the Lithuanian
labor market score in this respect?  The data indicate that flexible forms of employment
are very  limited in Lithuania  Fixed term and  temporary  contracts  are not popular and
account for only 6.5 percent  of all employment  contracts.  Similarly, part-time jobs  are
held  by  less  than  9  percent  of workers,  and  thus  are  relatively  rare.  Finally,  self-
employment  is not a common form of employment,  either.  Only one in ten Lithuanian
workers chooses self-employment as a way of earning a living, which is less than in most
transition economies of Central Europe, and also less than in some EU countries,  such as
Spain  or  the  U.K  (Table  20).  Accordingly,  the vast  majority  of jobs  are  traditional
permanent,  full-time  and dependent  jobs.  If anything,  flexibility  is  achieved  through
employment  adjustment  (firing  and  hiring),  rather  than  by  using  flexible  forms  of
employment.  Relatively few workers are ready to give up traditional regular employment
and take up the risk of becoming self-employed entrepreneurs.
55Table  20  Non-Agricultural Self-employment:  Lithuania against Selected  Countries
Self  -employment
% of total employment
Lithuania (2001)  10.5








United Kingdom  11.4
United States  7.0
Note: Data refer to 1998 unless stated otherwise
Source:  Lithuania: LFS May 2001, Bank staff calculations.
Poland: LFS February 1999, Bank staff calculations
OECD: OECD Employment Outlook 2000
The  limited  incidence  of  flexible  forms  of employment  reflects  the  existing
regulatory restrictions on the use of fixed-tern  contracts, possibly unfavorable  treatment
of part-time employment with respect to the entitlement to various work-related benefits,
and probably the lack of tradition and incentives to use flexible contracts.  The low share
of self-employment  is  somewhat  surprising  given  the  innovative  system  of so  called
"patents",  i.e.,  licenses  (permits)  to  carry  out  short-term  economic  activity.  These
"patents",  which  are  relatively  cheap  and  easy  to  obtain,  are  intended  to  formalize
activities usually carried out in the informal  sector (small trade, some services,  etc.).  One
would  have  expected  that  this  system  will  result  in  an  increased  scope  of  self-
employment,  which  apparently  is  not  the  case  (although  one  does  not  know  the
counterfactual).
The  presented  data  show  that  there  is  still  room  in  Lithuania  to  increase
employment through a more widespread utilization of flexible employment contracts  and
self-employment options.  In this context, the recent plans to restrict the use of fixed-term
contracts by limiting the number of permissible renewals to one  seem counterproductive.
56While  the idea behind  these plans-to  increase job  security  and protect  workers  from
possible  abuse of FTCs by employers-is understandable,  its implementation  is likely to
be achieved  at the cost of limiting hiring and employment  growth.  There is a trade-off
here, but given high unemployment in Lithuania,  the priority should be given to fostering
hiring.  At the same time, extra care should be taken not to create  a dual labor market:  a
highly protected  segment, consisting of workers with secure jobs, who practically  cannot
be  dismissed,  and  an  unprotected  segment  consisting  of workers  having  precarious,
temporary jobs.  Such dualism  is  in  general  bad for labor market  and  macroeconomic
performance  and can be  avoided by deregulating  and  improving  flexibility of the  labor
market at large.
Earnings Inequality
Labor  market  liberalization  and  institutional  changes  associated  with  the
economic  transition have brought about a marked  increase  in earnings  inequality.  As a
result, jobs differ substantially in terms of the pay they offer.  In particular, low and high
paying  jobs  have  emerged,  while  the  number  of middle  paying  jobs,  which  were
prevalent  under  central  planning,  has  shrunk  dramatically.  This  trend  of increasing
earnings inequality has been characteristic of virtually all transition economies,  although
the countries vary significantly as to the attained  level of inequality  (Rutkowski,  2001).
How large are earnings  inequalities  in Lithuania?  What is the risk of low-pay and what
are the  chances of high  earnings?  This section  will attempt to  answer these  questions.
The answers  are  important not only from the point of view of workers'  well-being,  but
also from the point of view of overall labor market flexibility.  Flexible labor market are
characterized  by higher earnings dispersion, which arguably is conducive for job creation
and higher employment (OECD 1994, Bertola et al., 2001).  Thus, a higher proportion of
low-paid jobs may imply a greater absolute number of jobs, especially low-skilled jobs.
Earnings inequality in Lithuania is rather low in comparison with other transition
economies  of Central  and Eastern  Europe  and  modest  by the EU  standards.  Table  21
shows  some  commonly  used  indicators  of  inequality  for  Lithuania.  The  Gini
coefficient-a  summary  measure  of inequality  ranging  from  0  (no  inequality)  to  100
(extreme  inequality)-amounts  to  27.3  in  Lithuania,  which  indicates  modest  earnings
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dispersion.  A more  intuitive measure  of inequality  is the  decile  ratio,  which can be
thought of as the ratio of high wages (upper decile) to low wages (bottom decile).  This
ratio is 2.8, which again indicates a modest level of inequality.
Table 21  Summary of Earnings Distribution, 2001
Gini
Mean  m  Median  Top  PlO  P90  coeff.  High-pay
decile  decile  ratio  pay
(*100)
Litas  %
All workers  639  357  600  1004  59.5  167.3  2.8  27.3  22.5  17.2
Sector
Public sector  734  367  640  1100  57.3  171.9  3.0  26.6  16.4  21.5
Private sector  646  350  520  1,000  67.3  192.3  2.9  27.4  27.1  14.0
Firmn size
-10  647  346  500  1,000  69.2  200.0  2.9  ..  34.8  12.5
11-19  625  357  500  1,000  71.4  200.0  2.8  ..  26.6  13.6
20-49  635  358  560  1,000  63.9  178.6  2.8  ..  23.9  12.2
50+  719  365  600  1,100  60.8  183.3  3.0  ..  17.6  20.6
Note:  PlO  denotes the earnings of thebottom decilerelative to the median, expressed as a percentage.  The incidence of
low (high) pay = low(high) paid workers  as a percentage  of  all full-time wage and salary workers.
Source. LaborForce  Survey, May 2001, Bank staffcalculations
Another  dimension  of wage  inequality  is  the  "distance"  between  the  low paid
worker (at the bottom  decile)  and the median  worker,  as well  as a distance between  the
median worker and the high paid worker (at the upper decile).  In line with earlier results,
these distances are not very high by standards of transition economies.  The bottom decile
worker earns about 60 percent of the median wage  (PlO ratio),  which means that his/her
relative  earnings position  is relatively  good.  On the other hand, the top  decile worker
earns  67  percent  more than the median  worker (P90 ratio),  implying  somewhat limited
premium for high skills (productivity).  In most transition economies the relative earnings
26  This figure, calculated using the household based LFS data is significantly lower  than the Gini coefficient calculated
using results of an employer based survey of wages  and reported m Rutkowski  (2001).  This  is quite common, however
renders assessing the "true"  degree of inequality,  and in particular international  comparisons,  difficult.  We have more
confidence in the value reported  here than in that reported  earlier  in Rutkowski  (2001) since the latter was  calculated
usmg aggregate data,  with  a high proportion  of workers  concentrated  m the bottom wage  bracket  (which  is likely to
lead  to the  overestimation  of the  degree  of inequality).  On  the other  hand,  the  figure  reported  here  is probably
somewhat  biased  downward  due to bunching  of reported  wages  around  some particular  values  (multiplies  of 100),
which is typical of household based surveys of wages.
58position  of low paid workers is worse than in  Lithuania,  while the relative position  of
highly paid  workers  is  better.  This  is  of course  tantamount  to  saying  that  earnings
dispersion in Lithuania is relatively limited.
Is  the  limited  earnings  dispersion  in  Lithuania  a good  news  or  bad  news  for
workers?  As already mentioned, the answer is ambiguous.  It is good news to the extent
higher income  inequality reduces  worker welfare.  On the other hand,  it is bad news to
the extent it entails  lower returns to high skills  and, even more importantly,  to the extent
it translates  in more hannful inequality,  namely that in access  to jobs.  The  latter effect
may  occur  if relative  wages  do  not  adjust  sufficiently  to  changes  in demand  for  and
supply  of different  categories  of workers  (e.g.,  low  skilled  workers  vs.  highly  skilled
workers)  and  thus  price  some  workers  out  of the  labor  market.  In  other  words,
insufficient wage  dispersion  may entail  the reduction  in the number of low skilled jobs
and thus contribute to unemployment.
Does the degree of wage flexibility-approximated  by wage dispersion-vary by
firm type?  For example do small private firms have a more dispersed wage structure than
large state owned firms?  Rather surprisingly,  there does not seem to be much difference
in wage  setting practices  between small and  large, private  and public firms.  Across all
types of firms  the  bottom  decile  wage  varies  between  350  and  370  Litas  and  the top
decile wage varies around 1,000 Litas.  The lack of visible differences in wage dispersion
across  sectors distinguishes  Lithuania  from other transition  economies,  where  as a rule
wage  variation  in  the  private  sector  is  considerably  higher  than  in  the  public  sector
(Rutkowski,  2001).  One  possible  reason,  relating  to  the  bottom  tail  of the  wage
distribution,  is  the  minimum  wage-which  has  more  "bite"  in  Lithuania  than  inmost
other  transition  economies-that  effectively  prevents  firms  from  adjusting  wages
downwards, and produces an uniform wage floor.  It is more difficult to  find a plausible
explanation for the compression at the top tail of the wage distribution.  More research is
needed,  taking into  account  differences  in human  capital  and other  factors  influencing
wages across firm types.
Another  facet  of labor  market  flexibility  and  associated  wage inequality  is the
proportion of low-paying and high-paying jobs.  The more flexible  the labor market, the
59higher the inequality and  the higher the incidence of low-and high-pay.  It is the low-
paying jobs that are the focus of social policy.  On the one  hand, low-paid workers  are
preponderant  among  the working  poor.  On the  other hand,  for many low-productivity
workers  getting a job, even a low-paid job, is the only way to escape poverty.  This is yet
another  reflection  of  ambiguity  associated  with  earnings  inequality  that  we  have
encountered  earlier.
Quite  surprisingly,  the  incidence  of low-pay  is  relatively  high  in  Lithuania,
especially  given  its  modest  level  of wage  inequality.  This  reflects  the  fact  that  the
earnings  distribution  in  Lithuania  is  strongly  positively  skewed,  i.e.,  has  a  short but
"heavy" lower tail.  As shown in Figure 2.3, the proportion of low paid jobs is high (this
proportion  is depicted  as the area under the curve left to the first vertical line), however
these  jobs  are  not  very  much  different  (in  money  terms)  from  middle  paying jobs
(depicted as the area under the curve between the two vertical  lines).
Specifically,  defining low pay in a common  way as earnings  less than two-thirds
of the  median,  we  find  that  23  percent  of workers  in  Lithuania  are  in  low-paid
employment.  This proportion  is high  by OECD  standards,  (although  not by transition
economies  standards)  and  is  higher  than  in  countries  with  a  comparable  level  of
inequality.  For  comparison,  the incidence  of low-pay  in the  Czech  Republic  (a  low
inequality country)  is around  16 percent, in Poland (moderate inequality  country)  is  18 -
19 percent,  an in Latvia (relatively high inequality country) is over 26 percent.  In most of
the EU countries the incidence of low pay does not exceed  15 percent.
The bottom line is that there is a lot of low-paid jobs in Lithuania,  but in relative
terms they are only moderately,  not extremely,  low-paid.  The implication  of this  is that
wage flexibility is probably sufficient to provide jobs for less skilled workers skills, but it
may  be  insufficient  to  provide  jobs  for  workers  with  no  or  little  skills,  which  are
disproportionately represented among the unemployed.
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Source: Labor Force  Survey, May 2001, Bank staffcalculations.
Which  firms provide low-paying jobs and which provide well-paying jobs?  Not
surprisingly,  in the private  sector low-paying jobs are more prevalent than in the public
sector  (27  percent  and  16  percent,  respectively).  Contrary  to  common  perception,
however, well-paying jobs are concentrated in the public sector,  rather than in the private
sector  (22  percent  and  14  percent,  respectively).  This  is not  untypical  for transition
economies,  what is striking is that the incidence of well-paying jobs in the private sector
is in Lithuania so much lower than in the public sector.  A couple of factors can account
for this situation.  First, the public sector may be located in more skill-intensive industries
(such as  education  and  health  care)  and  thus  have higher proportion  of highly skilled
labor.  Second,  there may be some rents in the public sector, which are appropriated  by
workers and which lead to wages higher than the equilibrium  level.  Determining which
factor  is  at  work  requires  further  investigation,  which  goes  beyond  the  scope  of this
paper.  The upshot is, that the private sector in Lithuania provides a large number of low-
paying  jobs  while  offering  relatively  few  opportunities  for  high  pay,  which  can  be
61interpreted  as  that's  sector  immaturity.  Probably,  as  the  sector  matures,  it  will
increasingly occupy the top-jobs niche.
Expectedly,  small  firms  are  the  main  source  of low-paying  jobs,  while  larger
firms are the main source of well paying jobs (Table 21).  In small firms (with less than
50 workers)  from  one-fourth to one-third  of all jobs are  low-paid  (the  smaller the  firm,
the larger the proportion).  In larger firms, the fraction of low-paid jobs-less than  one-
fifth-is much smaller, although still sizeable.  Conversely,  few jobs (12-14 percent) pay
well in small  firms,  while in larger firms one-fifth of all jobs is relatively well paid.  In
line  with  these  data,  the  average  wage  is  small  finns  is  lower  than  in  larger  firms,
although this simple comparison disregards  inter-firm differences in human capital.
To  summarize,  wage  flexibility  seems to be limited in Lithuania,  particularly  at
the lower end of the wage distribution,  which is probably accounted  for by the relatively
high  minimum  wage.  Although  low  paid jobs  are  numerous,  the wage  differential
between  a low  paid job and  the median job  is rather  modest.  This  suggests,  that  the
supply of jobs  for workers  with  lowest  skills and productivity  may be unduly limited.
Small  private firms provide the bulk of low-paid jobs,  and pay on average  lower wages
than larger and state owned firms.  This reinforces  the view that they constitute the most
flexible but also the least protected  segment  of the labor market.  The segment is large,
serving mainly workers in the bottom tail of the skill distribution.  Firms in this segment
offer mainly low productivity,  low paid, precarious or casual jobs.  These jobs may not be
valued highly from the worker welfare perspective, but often they are the only chance for
the unemployed to find work.
IV.  EMPLOYER  PERSPECTIVE:  CONSTRAINTS TO EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE
ADJUSTMENTS
This section looks at constraints faced by employers in adjusting employment and
wages to the changing demand  conditions.  Constraints to employment adjustment come
primarily  from the  employment  protection  legislation  (the  labor code),  which  imposes
some  firing  and  hiring  costs.  Constraints  to  wage  adjustment  come  mainly  from  the
existence of the statutory minimum  wage.  We briefly describe  existing legal  framework
for employment  and wage protection and compare  it with that existing in selected  other
62transition economies.  We  also try to assess to  what extent  the regulations  are binding,
and  recommend  some  measures  to  improve  labor  market  flexibility.  Our  analysis
indicates  that  regulatory  barriers  to  labor  market  flexibility  are  modest  in  Lithuania,
broadly  in  line  with  those  in  other  transition  economies  characterized  by  relatively
flexible labor  markets.  However,  relatively high minimum  wage  is  likely  to constrain
necessary  wage  adjustments.  Both  these  facts-relatively  low  firing costs  and  high
minimum wage-are consistent with  high rates  of job turnover and  a modest degree  of
wage  dispersion  documented  earlier.  Although  labor  market  rigidities  are  not
overwhelming  in  Lithuania,  in  some  dimension  labor  market  flexibility  can  be
improved-we address some of the issues in the concluding part of this section.
Constraints To Employment Adjustment
In theory, dismissals are  easy in Lithuania  In practice  they may turn  out rather
difficult  and  costly.  The Law on  Employment  Contract  (which is a part of the  Labor
Code)  lists  a  number  of valid  reasons  for  dismissal,  which  include  business  needs
(e.g., changes  in  organization  of production)  and  poor-performance  on  the  part  of  a
worker.  However,  employers  tend to  complain  that in practice  dismissals  are difficult
since the burden  of proof that a dismissal  was justified  is  on the  employer.  Workers
(especially those laid off for disciplinary reasons)  often resort to court  appeal,  claiming
unfair  dismissal,  and  courts  tend  to  exhibit  a pro-labor  bias  and  as  a  rule  order job
reinstatement  and  payment  of compensation  amounting  to  forgone  earnings  (up  to  12
months  salary).  To the extent this indeed is the case, there is a risk involved  in firing a
worker,  and  monetary  costs  of  dismissal-if  found  invalid-can  turn  out  to  be
substantial.  This can effectively prevent some employers from firing redundant workers.
It seems, however,  that the dismissal  costs  result mainly form the judicial  interpretation
of the law in favor of workers, rather than from the law itself.
The law offers a way to reduce the risk associated with dismissals, but this comes
at  relatively  high  price.  There  is  a  provision  whereby  an  unconditional  dismissal  is
feasible  (i.e.,  the  employer  is  not required  to  prove  a  valid  reason)  provided  that the
employer  pays  a  statutory  compensation.  The  amount  of  the  compensation  is
proportional to job tenure and ranges from 4 months to 12 months salary.
63In the case of normal  dismissals,  the  employer  has  to give  an advanced  notice
two months prior to termination of employment and offer severance pay, which is related
to job tenure and ranges from 1 month to 3 months salary.27 These costs are the same for
both individual  and collective  dismissals.28 However, in the case of collective dismissal
local authorities can suspend the dismissal for up to 6 weeks,  which can lead to additional
costs.  All  in  all,  these  dismissal  costs  are  within  the  range  characteristic  of other
transition and OECD economies,  although the advanced notice in Lithuania is rather long
for  workers  with  short  job  tenure-2  months  compared  with  2  weeks  in  Poland
(Annex 2).
Fixed-term  contracts  are a second-best  way of lowering  employment adjustment
costs in countries where the termination of indefinite duration  employment  contracts  is
difficult and costly.  However,  in many countries  there are regulatory restrictions on the
use of fixed-term  contracts  in  order to prevent  their  abuse  by employers  and  provide
greater job stability to workers.  Such restrictions  exist also in Lithuania  and  consist of
both a limit on the maximum  cumulated  duration of successive contracts  (5 years), and
the number of successive  renewals  (two).29 These  restrictions seem  excessive.  Given
that employers  facing fluctuations  in demand prefer short-term (one-year,  say) contracts,
the effective total duration of fixed-term contracts is likely to be limited in most cases to
two years.  As a rule, countries use either a limit on the total duration,  or a limit on the
number of renewals (Annex 2).
An  alternative  to  employment  adjustment  is  working  time  adjustment.  In
Lithuania employers  have an option to redistribute working hours within a period of one
quarter  and  to use  overtime,  which  implies  some  degree  of working  time  flexibility.
However  this  degree  is  limited  and  can be  enhanced.  First,  the period within  which
employers  are allowed to redistribute  working hours is relatively  short.  The longer the
period  during  which  employers  can  reschedule  working hours  the  larger  the room to
adjust working  time  to  seasonal  fluctuations  in  demand.  The  world trend  is toward
27  Some  worker  groups,  such  as  workers  with  children,  workers  with  disabilities  and  workers near  retirement,  are
entitled for 4 months advanced  notice of dismissal.
28 In many countnes  collective dismissals are associated  with higher costs than  individual dismissals.  For example,  in
Poland severance pay is mandatory only in the case of a collective dismissal.
29  It is planned that in the revised version of the labor code the renewals of fixed term contract will be prohibited.
64annualization  of working  hours,  i.e.,  calculating  the  weekly  working time  on  a yearly
basis (Ozaki,  1999).
Second, the use of overtime is restricted by a relatively  strict yearly  limit of 120
hours, and by a high mandatory  overtime premium (50 percent of base salary).  The limit
on the  use of overtime  is  in Lithuania much  stricter  than in most other countries.  For
examnple,  in Estonia and Hungary it is 200 hours.  As regards mandatory overtime premia,
they are high in most transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe,  and Lithuania
is not an exception.  It should be borne in mind however that in many OECD countries
overtime premium is only 25 percent, thus is half as high as in Lithuania.  Moreover,  in
many  countries  efforts  have  been  made  to  minimize  the  cost  of overtime  work.  An
increasingly  widespread  measure  is  to  grant  compensatory  rest  time  instead  of extra
overtime payments (Ozaki,  1999).
Constraints To Wage Adjustment
Constraints  to  wage  adjustment  come  from  the  existence  of  the  statutory
minimum  wage,  as well  as  from  other  so  called  wage  floors,  such as  unemployment
benefit, which provide a floor for the wage distribution.  Here we focus on the role played
by the minimum  wage.  Since the mid  1990s the minimum wage in Lithuania  has been
relatively  high  (Table 22).  Currently  it accounts  for about  40 percent  of the  average
(mean) wage.  This is high by standards of most transition economies of CEE, where the
minimum wage tends  to account  for around  30-35  percent of the average  wage, but for
example in Estonia the minimum wage  accounts  for less than  30 percent of the average
wage (IMF,  2001).
Table 22  Evolution of the Minimum Wage,  1994-2000
Minimum wage as % of  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Gross average wage  15.5  26.1  35.7  45.8  41.4  40.0  39.5
Median wage  ..  ..  ..  ..  50.1
Bottom decile  ..  ..  ..  ..  97.1
Source.  Earnings indices 1991-2000,  Statistics Lithuania,  Vilnius  2001.  Earnings distribution in  October 1999,
Statistics Lithuania, Vilnius 2000.
65Although  the "bite" of the minimum wage is commonly measured by the ratio of
the minimum  wage  to  the  mean  wage,  this  can  be  misleading,  especially when  wage
distribution is unequal  and widening.  The problem with using the average  (mean) wage
is that it is not representative of market wages of "typical"  and all the more of low-skilled
workers.  The average wage is to a large extent influenced by earnings at the top of the
distribution,  and owing to the asymmetric  nature of earnings  distribution, a vast majority
of workers earn less than the minimum wage.  Therefore a more accurate measure of the
bite of the minimum wag is the ratio of the minimum wage to the median wage,  or to the
bottom  decile.  On these measures  the bite of the minimum  wage in Lithuania  proves
substantial.  The minimum  wage accounts for 50 percent of the median wage and is close
to the bottom decile.  The latter  fact indicates that there is a relatively  large number of
workers working at or even below the minimum wage.30
High  minimum  wage  prevailing  in Lithuania  in  recent  years  might have  had a
negative employment  impact.  This is because a minimum wage that is high relative  to
productivity inhibits the creation and encourages the destruction of low-productivity jobs.
The gain is faster restructuring  and higher average productivity,  however it comes at the
high  social  costs of higher unemployment,  as low-skilled workers  are priced  out of the
market.  Put differently,  high  minimum  wage  leads  to  employment  rather  than wage
adjustment, which carries both benefits  and costs (Boeri and Terrell, 2001).
Are the Constraints Binding?
Regulatory constraints restrict employers'  choices to the extent they are strict and
enforced.  For example, the minimum wage set a very low level relative to the average
wage would  have no  impact  on the employers  decisions  regarding  employment.  Nor
would have a high minimum wage if enforcement was lax, i.e., there was no penalty for
violating the law.  We use a simple  "test"  to determine if regulatory  constraints to labor
market flexibility are binding in Lithuania.  Namely,  we look at labor market outcomes
which are indicative of flexibility, such as job creation, job destruction,  wage distribution,
30  Relaively high incidence of mmumum or sub-minimum  wage employment in Lithuania can be in part accounted for
by underreporting of wages by employers in order to lower the burden of taxation and social security contributions.
66etc.  To some extent we have already done this earlier, so here we mainly summarize the
findings.
Employment protection legislation  and associated  dismissal  costs do not seem to
significantly  restrict  employers'  ability  to  adjust  the  size  and  composition  of  their
workforce to the changing product market conditions.  High job turnover and in particular
the  high  job  destruction  rate  which  persist  in  Lithuania  attest  that  firing  is  not
prohibitively costly or difficult.
Firing  seems to be  easier in  small  firms  and more  difficult  in large  firms.  One
factor behind this is likely to be trade union presence in large, especially privatized firms.
Evidence  from other transition  economies  suggests  that it  is usually  the  interaction  of
labor  market  regulations,  union  power and  ownership  structure  which  results  in labor
market  rigidities.  Given  regulatory  framework,  what  makes  a  difference  is  union
presence and power.  That is, lay-offs tend to be difficult in firms with strong unions and
easier in firms without or with weak unions.  In other words, trade unions play a key role
in effectively enforcing  labor market regulations.  Based on casual evidence it seems that
Lithuania  conforms  with  this  pattern:  employment  protection  regulations  are  mainly
enforced  in  large,  unionized  firms,  while  in  small  private,  non-unionized  firms
enforcement  is weaker.  This  increases  labor market flexibility,  but in some  cases  may
come  at the price of violation of basic  worker rights and standards.  This is not only a
theoretical possibility, but reality in many small firms.  According to anecdotal evidence,
in many  small  firms  basic  standards  of occupational  health  and  safety  are  often  not
observed.  There is  a trade-off here,  and  not always  the optimal  balance  is  struck.  In
some  firms  there  is  too  little  worker  protection  while  in  others  there  is  too  much
protection and  too  little  flexibility.  Relaxing  some of the regulatory restrictions  while
improving enforcement would probably improve the social outcome.
The  minimum  wage  is  likely  to  be  a  binding  constraint  to  wage  adjustment,
although is some segments of the economy enforcement  seems lax.  The major piece of
indirect evidence  on the  detrimental  effects of the  high minimum wage  in  Lithuania is
high unemployment concentrated  among less productive workers: the youth and the low-
skilled.  Consistent  with this is  wage  distribution  that  is compressed  at the lower end.
67There  is  a  visible  spike  at the  minimum  wage,  suggesting  that  it  truncates  the wage
distribution.  The  bite of the minimum  wage  is  particularly pronounced  in industries
employing  large  numbers  of  low  skilled  workers,  such  as  agriculture,  hotels  and
restaurants,  and trade.  In these industries the incidence of minimum  and sub-minimum
wage  employment  ranges from  20 to  30 percent.  However,  these figures also  indicate
that some workers are paid less than the minimum wage.
Indeed,  the average wage in the lowest wage bracket is significantly less than the
minimum wage, implying that enforcement  is weak.31  To the extent  employers are able
to circumvent  the minimum  wage  regulation,  it  obviously  does not  harm employment.
However (similarly as in the case of the employment protection regulations) it would be
preferable  to  adopt  a lower  minimum  wage with  stricter  enforcement,  rather  than  the
other way round.
While  probably  limiting  employment  chances  of less-sldlled  workers,  the high
minimum  wage  in  Lithuania  has  likely  contributed  to  the  fast  pace  of  enterprise
restructuring  and productivity improvements.  By restricting adjustment of wages to the
fall in the demand  for low-skilled  labor,  the high minimum wage  in Lithuania  forced
employers to close low-productivity jobs implying  a rise in the average productivity level
The  high  rate of job  reallocation  provides  support  to  this  view.  If this  argument  is
correct,  then the high minimum wage would explain the apparent paradox that high job
turnover coexists  in Lithuania with a stagnant unemployment  pool.  Job turnover is high,
because  employers  have  to  close  low-productivity  jobs  and replace  them  with  higher
productivity jobs.  The unemployment  pool  is  stagnant since low-productivity  workers
due to the high minimum wage are locked out of employment (Boeri and Terrell, 2001).
To  conclude,  Lithuania  has  a  modestly  restrictive  employment  protection
regulations  but a relatively  high minimum  wage.  However,  the  effects  of legal  norms
seem  to be unevenly distributed  across  different segments of the economy.  There  is  a
flexible segment,  consisting of small private non-unionized firms, where  enforcement of
regulations  is  weak  and  thus  they  hardly  constrain  employers  ability  to  adjust
31  According  to the employer based  survey,  the average wage in the lowest wage bracket m  1999 was  330 Lits while
the minimum wage was 430 Litas.  Although  the former figure is biased downwards  due to the inclusion of part-time
workers, still the discrepancy  is substantial.
68employment  and wages.  At the same time, there is a less flexible segment, consisting of
large public or privatized  firms with strong  unions, where actual  firing and hiring costs
are  higher,  and  thus  the  adjustment  capacity  is  lower.  And on  top of this there  is  a
substantial  informal  sector  where  employers  by  definition  face  virtually no  regulatory
constraints and flexibility is unfettered.32
All in  all,  employers  in Lithuania  face  few  effective  constraints to  employment
adjustment,  although  it  involves  some procedural  and  monetary  costs.  However,  they
face  a constraint  to  wage  adjustment  resulting  from a relatively  high  minimum  wage,
despite  the fact that  enforcement  is not very  strict.  As a consequence,  job turnover  is
high but so is unemployment,  concentrated  among those with low-skills  and little labor
market experience.
Policy Recommendations
Although the labor market in Lithuania  is relatively  flexible, there is a number of
measures that if undertaken would improve labor market performance.  These include:
*  Lowering  dismissal  cots  by  making  advance  notice of dismissal  related  to job
tenure and shortening it for workers with short tenure;
*  Liberalizing the use of fixed-term contracts by removing  a limit on the number of
successive renewals while keeping the existing limit on total duration;
*  Adopting  the  practice  of annualization  of working  hours,  i.e.,  calculating  the
weekly working time on a yearly basis;
*  Lowering the cost of overtime  work by allowing social partners to negotiate  the
number of hours as well as the amount and forms of compensation  (monetary vs.
time  oft),  while  setting  the  ceiling  on the total  number  of hours  (at  least  200
hours) and the minimum overtime premium at 25 percent of the base salary;
*  Gradually  lowering  the  minimum  wage  as  proportion  of  the  average  wage
(e.g.,  by  suspending  the  cost  of  living  adjustment)  to  about  one-third  of the
32  According to data compiled  by SODRA  (Social Security  Institution), the share of informal sector in employment is
from 8 to  13 percent (depending on the definition adopted).
69average  wage,  and in the future pegging the minimum wage to movements in the
median rather than mean wage; and
Alternatively,  differentiating  the  minimum  wage  by  instituting  a  youth  sub-
minimum, accounting  for 80 percent, say, of the regular minimum wage.
More  generally,  labor  market  performance  could be  improved  by letting  social
partners  "negotiate  flexibility",  which  would  be  consistent  with  a  world-wide  trend
(Ozaki,  1999).  This  would  imply  deregulating  labor  relations  and  devolving  the
responsibility for determining  them to  social partners themselves,  while the state would
be responsible for setting and enforcing only basic norms and standards.  In other words,
the state should reduce  the scope of its regulatory activity in the area of labor relations,
and at the same should improve its capacity to enforce basic worker rights and standards.
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Overall,  the  labor  market  in  Lithuania  is  relatively  flexible.  There  are  few
effective  constraints  to  employment  adjustment,  as  witnessed  by  high  rates  of job
creation and job destruction.  However, the  scope for wage adjustment  is limited due to
the relatively high statutory minimum wage, which might have led to elimination of low-
productivity jobs.  As a result, there has been far reaching reallocation of labor associated
with substantial  productivity  improvements  and thus relatively  high economic  growth.
At the same time,  labor resources have been underutilized,  which manifests  itself in the
relatively low labor force participation  rate and high unemployment,  concentrated among
low-productivity workers.  In short, the structure  of the labor market in Lithuania favors
productivity  and  wage  growth  over  employment  growth.  Labor market  institutions  in
Lithuania  do  not  seem  to  inhibit  economic  growth,  however  they  produce  'Jobless"
growth and persistent unemployment.
Main Issues
Macroeconomic  Perspective
The Lithuanian  labor market is conducive to efficient  allocation of resources  and
productivity  growth,  but  not  contributing  to  full  utilization  of  labor  resources  and
70employment growth.  Specifically, the following trends and patterns prevailing since mid
1990s stand out:
*  Economic  growth has  been  achieved  due to productivity  growth with declining
employment and rising unemployment;
*  The growth  of productivity has  translated  into an  even faster growth  of wages,
leading  to the increase  in unit labor cost with  a potentially negative  impact  on
labor demand;
*  Employment-to-population  ratio has been low, largely due to high unemployment
and low labor force participation of younger and older workers;
*  Despite the substantial labor market slack job turnover has been considerable.  A
large number of new jobs has been created coupled  with a large scale destruction
of old jobs.  There  has  been  a dramatic  reallocation  of jobs  away  from  low-
productivity  uses  towards  high-productivity  uses,  indicating  far  reaching
enterprise restructuring;
*  New jobs have been largely  created  by small  and medium sized firms  as well  as
by business start-ups.  At the same time, SMEs have destroyed a large  number of
jobs  and  consequently  employment  at  SMEs-as  in  larger  firms-has  not
increased;
*  Export  orientation,  capital  investment,  and  productivity  improvements  are  key
determinants ofjob creation by firms;
*  At level of an industry,  high job destruction  does not necessarily imply a net fall
in employment.  In  fact,  employment  growth at the industry  level  is negatively
(although  weakly)  correlated  with  the  rate  of job  destruction,  nor  enterprise
restructuring  is  tantamount  to  job  losses.  After  all,  employment  growth  is
(weakly) positively correlated with the rate of job reallocation.  Thus restructuring
tends to be associated  with employment growth, not fall.  This is in contrast with
popular view according to which restructuring is equivalent to downsizing;
71*  Job reallocation takes place largely within an industry,  while reallocation  across
industries  is limited.  Similarly, job reallocation  takes place within,  rather  than
between, regions; and
*  The  fast  pace  of job  reallocation  occurring  in  Lithuania  has  contributed  to
unemployment by bringing about skill and spatial mismatches, and by giving rise
to productivity gains, which in the short-run might have led to employment losses.
Worker Perspective
Workers  in  Lithuania  face  job  insecurity  and  difficulties  in  finding  new
employment.  Especially less skilled workers  are at a high risk of unemployment,  which
often is of a long-term nature.  Low chances of escaping  unemployment  are associated
w th the skills gap but also with the wage rigidity at the bottom of the distribution.  Low
skilled  workers  seem to be locked out of employment  by the relatively high minimum
wage.  Overall,  from the worker perspective  the labor market is stagnant  in Lithuania,
and employment prospects are bleak.
The following stylized facts illustrate major issues:
*  The high job destruction rate is  associated  with a short  average job tenure  and
high  inflows  into unemployment.  The  laid  off workers  are  the  single  largest
group  among the unemployed,  however those who quitted their jobs voluntarily
are a sizeable minority;
*  Although  the  rate  of job  creation  rate  is  high,  it  has  a  limited  impact  on
unemployment.  This is because  employers  tend to hire from the ranks of already
employed  (job-to-job  transitions)  and  new  labor  market  entrants.  The
unemployed account for less than one-half of all hires;
*  Accordingly,  the exit rate  from  unemployment  is low  and  unemployment  is  a
rising pool.  On average,  the duration of unemployment  spells is very long which
leads  to a high share of long-term  unemployment.  The overall  mobility across
labor force  states is low;
*  The unemployed,  and especially  the long-term unemployed,  tend to have lower
educational  attainment  and lower skills than the employed.  There is a skills gap
72and  mismatch,  which  cannot  be  eliminated  solely thanks  to  an  increase  in the
overall number of  jobs;
*  Small  firms hire the most workers  (relative to their employment)  and  thus offer
the best chances to find a new job for an unemployed person.  At the same time
however the average job tenure at small firns is short and job security is low;
*  The use of flexible forms of employment is limited.  Self-employment,  temporary
employment  or part-time  employment  are  relatively  rare.  At  the  same  time,
informal sector employment is sizeable;  and
*  Earnings dispersion is modest.  In particular,  wages tend to be compressed  at the
bottom end of the distribution.  The incidence  of low-pay is high,  however the
differential  between "low wages" and the median wage is modest.
Employer  Perspective
The labor market in Lithuania is over regulated,  however actual constraints to the
adjustment of the  size  and  the composition  of the  workforce  are modest,  in  line  with
those prevailing  in OECD  countries.  There are some procedural  and monetary costs of
firing, but they do not prevent employers  from closing unproductive jobs and  laying-off
redundant workers.
Wage flexibility is limited by a relatively high minimum wage, which is likely to
prevent  employers  from creating  low-productivity jobs.  Although the  minimum wage
regulation seems to be circumvented in some  segments of the economy (largely in small
firms), it nonetheless  is binding  in other segments  (mainly in larger firms), with a likely
negative impact on employment of low-productivity workers.  More generally,  employers
in Lithuania  face relatively  stringent employment  protection regulations  combined  with
relatively  lax  enforcement  (or  no  enforcement  in  the  informal  sector),  which  is  an
undesirable mix.
Among  issues  that  should  be  addressed  by  labor  market  reforms  aiming  at
improving labor market flexibility are the following:
73*  Excessive dismissal costs for some categories of workers (e.g., workers with short
job tenure);
*  Excessive restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts;
*  Excessive restrictions on the use of overtime;  and
*  Relatively high statutory minimum wage.
Policy Implications
The  list of issues  presented  above  indicates  that  the  functioning  of the  labor
market  in Lithuania can be improved and  also points to some policy recommendations.
The key ones include:
*  Improving  business  environment,  especially  for  SMEs.  Small  firms  are
particularly  vulnerable  to bureaucratic  harassment  and  taxation  (in the broadest
meaning of the word).  At the same time,  SMEs play a critical part in both job
creation  and job  destruction.  Improving  business  environment  thus  carries  the
potential to foster job creation and inhibit job destruction with resulting growth in
employment;
*  Lowering  barriers to entry.  Business start-ups account for a large fraction of all
newly created jobs.  Accordingly,  fostering entry of new  firms is likely to result in
faster job creation;
*  Fostering the creation of new jobs (by improving  investment climate)  rather than
preventing the destruction of unviable,  low-productivity jobs.  Analysis indicates
that  job  destruction  and  restructuring  are  conducive,  not  detrimental,  to
employment  growth.  Accordingly,  attempts  to forestall  restructuring  in order to
protect jobs are in the longer-run counter-productive;
*  Improving  access  to credit by small firms with growth  potential, and tightening
banking practices to prevent the absorption of credit by unviable firms;
*  Improving  the skills of poorly  educated  workers  as a means  of addressing  the
crucial  problem of the skills gap.  This can be achieved by improving  access  to
and  better  quality  of primary  and  secondary  education,  including  vocational
74education.  Emphasis should be placed on making workers with lower educational
attainment trainable  and employable,  rather than  on mechanically  increasing the
number of workers with higher education;
*  Enhancing wage  flexibility  in order  to  accommodate  the  excess  supply of low
skilled workers.  This can be achieved  either by reducing  the minimum wage as a
percentage  of the average wage, or by differentiating  the minimum wage,  e.g., by
introducing the youth sub-minimum;
*  Promoting flexible forms of employment,  including fixed-term contracts,  in order
stimulate labor supply (e.g., part-time work by women) and labor demand; and
*  Most generally and importantly, reversing the implicit rule "strict regulations with
lax enforcement" by deregulating  labor relations  and devolving  the responsibility
to shape them to social partners, and simultaneously by improving enforcement of
key labor rights and standards.
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77Annex 1
Description of the Survey of Employment and Wages
The Lithuanian Department of Statistics carries out an annual  survey of employment and
wages  (known  as DA-03).  This  survey was  a primary  source  for the  analysis  of job
creation and job destruction.  The main characteristics of the survey are as follows.
Firm Coverage
The survey is a census of all registered enterprises  in the non-financial  sector (regardless
of size,  frmn ownership,  etc.).  However,  excluded  are  individual  natural person firms,
agricultural firms,  financial enterprises,  and budgetary units (schools, hospitals,  etc.).33
Definitions
Employment  =  average  employment  (over  a  year),  including  full-time  and  part-time
workers.
Wages = annual gross wage bill (including social security contributions).
Non-Response  and Missing Values
If a firm does not respond to the survey but is active (according to the Business Register),
then data is imputed based  on administrative  records.  The Statistical  Department  makes
substantial effort to deternine if the non-response  is due to the lack of activity, or due to
unwillingness  to  respond.  The lack  of activity  is coded  as zero  (or a missing  value),
whereas  in the case of a genuine  non-response an estimate  is substituted for actual  data.
This allows one to identify business start-ups and closures.
Business start ups are defined as follows:
E(t) = 0 and E(t+l) > 0.
Business closures are defined as:
E(t) > 0 and E(t+l) = 0
where E(t) stands for employment at time t.
Data Cleaning
In  a  few  cases  matched  employment  records  showed  implausibly  large  increases  or
decreases in firm employment over a year.  Such large employment changes are likely to
reflect either mergers,  or splits, or can be spurious, i.e., reflect errors in data entry.  Given
that such  outliers have a large weight and bias the data on job creation  and destruction,
they were removed  from the  data  set.  An observation  was treated  as  an  outlier if the
employment  change  was large  in  both  absolute  and relative  terms.  A  large  absolute
change  was  defined  as  that  exceeding  two  standard  deviations  (the  distribution  of
33  Strictly speaking,  data for the so called budgetary units are provided at the county  level, but not at the individual unilt
level.  The county level data were not used in the analysis of job turnover.
78employment  changes  is approximately  normal).  A large relative change  was defined as
either  50  percent  fall  in  employment  or  600  percent  increase  in  employment.
79Annex 2
Indicators of Employment Protection in Lithuania and Selected Transitim  Economies (as of 2001)
Lithuania  Estonia  Hungary  Poland
A.  Individual  dismnissal
Conditions for fair dismissal  Business needs, non-  Non-performance  or  Non-performance or  Lack of competence,








Advanced notice  Unrelated to tenure  Related to tenure  Related to tenure  Related to tenure
Minimum  2 months  2 months  30 days  2 weeks
Maximum  4 months (workers with  4 months (if tenure  90 days  3 months
children,  workers 5  more than 10 years)
years before retirement,
disabled, etc.)
Severance pay  Related to employer  Related to employer
tenure  tenure
Minimum  1 month salary  2 months  I month (tenure <5  None, but 1 month in
years)  case of termination due
to disability or
retirement
Maximum  3 months salary  4 months salary  6 months (tenure>25
12 months for civil  years)
servants
80Lithuania  Estonia  Hungary  Poland
Monetary compensation in case of unfair  Forgone earnings up to  Up to 6 months wages  Severance pay is  Forgone earnings up to
dismissal  12 months salary  doubled and extended to  two months plus
those below 3 years of  compensation up to 3
tenure  months salary
B.  Collective  dismissals
Minimum number of workers constituting  10 workers within 30  Not regulated  10 workers  10% of workers in firms
collective  dismissal  days  legislatively  employing less than
1,000 workers within 30
days
Obligatory notification, consultations, or  information sent to local  Notification of workers'  Consultations  with trade  Consultations with trade
approval  government and local  representatives  unions or works  unions, notification of
labor office  councils; notification of  local labor office
local employment office.
Delay  to start  of notice and additional notice  Notification of local  Not regulated  30 days  45 days (elaborate)
period  labor office 3 months  legislatively  90 days if 25% of
prior to planned  workforce  or 50+
dismissal  employees are involved
Type of negotiations required (number of  Attempt of  Not regulated  Consultations on  Agreement on the
workers, selection criteria, redeployment,  redeployment is a  legislatively  planned reductions and  number of workers to be
retraining, outplacement,  severance  pay,  etc.)  precondition  for  ways to mitigate its  dismissed and selection
dismissal  effects  criteria.  If agreement
cannot be reached, the
ultimate decision is with
management..
Severance  pay  No special provisions  No special regulations  No special  regulations  Related to total length of
for collective dismissals  for collective dismissals  service
Mmiimum  1 month (less than 10
years)
Maximum  3 month (more than 20
years)
Fixed term contracts  l_l__  l_l_  l
Limitations on use  Only in the case of work  Objective reason (list of  No restrictions expect  No restrictions Limitations  on use  that is temporary in  6 permissible reasons)  for public service
nature  (objective reason only)
Maximum  number of  successive  contracts  2  (plan is to decrease to  No limit specified  No limit specified  2
1)  I  I  i
Maximum cumulated duration of successive  5 years  5 years  5 years  No limit specified
contracts
81Overtime  _
Limitations on use (other than protection of women,  Special business needs;  Special business needs
minors, etc.)  worker's consent
required
Yearly limit (hours)  120  200  200; up to 300 if agreed  150
in collective bargaining
Overtime premium  at least 50% of base  at least 50% of base  50% of  base salary  50% of base salary for
salary  salary  two first hours; 100% for
_______________________________________  ___________________  ~~~ensuing  hours
Redistribution of worldng hours  Possible within 4 months  By agreement of parties  Possible within one year  Not provided for
period
Collective  bargaining
Dominant bargaining levels  Firm  National (mostly  Firm  Firm
bargaimng over
minimum wage)
Mandatory extensions of industry level agreements  No  No  No  No
to non-participating  firms
Statutory minimum wage  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Determined by  Government;  proposal  Government; proposal  Government through  Government,  based on
submitted by tree-partite  submitted by tree-  negotiations with trade  proposal submitted by
council  partite council  unions  tripartite  council.
Regular periodical adjustment for changes in costs  Periodical adjustments  Negotiated  Regular yearly  Yes
of living  adjustment
Percentage of the average wage  Around 40  Around 30  Around 30% until 2001  around 40
40% since January 2001
Source  OECD  Employment Outlook 1999, National legislatwn and regulations
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